I have acquired a hobby lately of watching debates (found on YouTube) between religious thinkers and atheist thinkers; I have enjoyed the eloquence of both sides in most cases. I am ever-annoyed, however, by the constantly attempted religious argument that, if there were no God(s), then we would have no morality, and therefore—since we clearly behave morally sometimes—there must be at least one god. That, to me, is not a compelling claim for the existence of God(s) (and not just because so many religious teachings seem profoundly immoral), and yet I have found the responses from the atheist side in the debates to be unsatisfying, so I would like to take a shot at it.
To my mind, proving the existence of an objective morality is a daunting task for both theists and non-theists. It is the classic philosophical challenge in logic of leaping from an understanding of what is, to a claim to what ought to be done about it. I see no evidence that religious people can answer this question any better than nonreligious people.
Consider the standard (and, I think, daunting) philosophical argument against the legitimacy of Divine Command Theory. If we imagine that we do have evidence that God(s) are telling us what to do, then moral philosophers argue that there are two ways to understand such moral prescriptions: either
(A) God(s) have discovered an objective morality, and so are interpreting it for us, or
(B) God(s) have invented morality.
In either case, the followers of God(s) “have a lot of their work still ahead of them” (to borrow a phrase from the the late atheist thinker, Christopher Hitchens):
Per (A) if a religious apologist wants to argue that God(s) are merely teaching us to understand the objective truth of morality, then we would now have an acknowledgement that morality could exist without God(s). That is, if morality is intrinsically true, and God(s) are simply explaining it to us, then morality would be true even if God(s) did not exist, and so therefore, since we believe that morality exists independently of God(s), we are not obligated to believe that God(s) also exist.
Per (B) if, however, a Divine Command Theory defender prefers to make the case that morality is a creation of God(s), then what reason would we have for believing such moral teaching? Perhaps the religious moralist would say that, since God(s) are all-knowing, they must be right. But what are they all-knowing about if morality does not exist independently of them? On what precept do we know that whatever God(s) feel or think is automatically right? Is it because they’re the smartest and/or the strongest? In this case, then morality is that which the smartest and/or most powerful force says is right. But that, in itself, is an objective moral claim (i.e. a claim beyond God, that we ought to follow the teachings of the smartest and the strongest). If, however, the Divine Command Theory apologist is not willing to make any such objective justification for accepting God(s)’s teachings, then he or she has no means by which to claim the legitimacy of his or her deity’s (or deities’) words.
In either case, we are back where started: on what basis can we claim something is right or wrong? If God(s) have provided us with a roadmap for morality, that’s interesting, but on what grounds do we have for trusting that guidance?
My personal nonreligious argument for morality requires only a root assumption that, all other things being equal, happiness is better than misery. I do not think that this is a foolproof argument because one can ask me what basis I have for making such a claim, and my only answer is that it is self-evident. With similar form, a Divine Command Theorist might also argue that he or she needs say no more than that God’s (or Gods’) righteousness is self-evident. Fair enough, but I believe a difference can be found in the quality of these two alleged antecedents for morality if we place them next to each other:
(1) Happiness is better than misery.
(2) God is always right.
I contend that my moral basis has meaning that we can all relate to that the religious one does not. By appealing to recognizable and identifiable human experience, my moral grounds do not depend on a fantastical assumption that there is an all-powerful transcendental force at the helm of our creation. This does not prove my moral claim to be correct, but I think it is a reasonable justification for any compassionate person to choose to behave morally. That is, if one believes that happiness is better than misery (in all sentient creatures), then one ought to aim for happiness-provoking actions, and avoid misery-yielding behaviours.
If a Divine Command Theorist is not satisfied with that argument, then that is fine; my only recourse is to point out that, while my happiness-is-better-than-misery argument does not prove morality right, it does give a credible explanation for why people might behave morally even if there weren’t God(s) supervising us. It’s patently possible that, by evolution, we have inherited a combination of compassion (that makes us want to do right by other sentient beings) and reason (that gives us the ability to extrapolate a moral code from such concern). The theory of evolution suggests that our species has derived its nature from eons of natural selection of the traits that would best ensure our survival; and it is reasonable to think that both compassion (by virtue of its ability to provoke cooperation) and reason (by virtue of its ability to sensibly assemble our best ideas) would be useful traits for our species’s success.
It is possible, of course, that God(s) created the natural world so that humanity could acquire such morality (or at least the appearance of it). However, since evolutionary theory shows it is also possible that humanity could have derived a moral compass without God(s), then the existence/appearance of morality is, I’m afraid, not evidence for the existence of God(s).
An interesting dissection of some of the points of contention between religious oriented and atheists. I do suspect that ultimately the religious will fall back upon an emtional or faith based posture. That is a defendable position, within itself I think, so I’m not sure why they feel the need to defend it with murky logic. Using a ‘happiness and misery’ basis for human existence would tend to fall into the balliwick of that same emotion based position although I recognize that your credo does not have a supreme being associated with it.
Tom2
I don’t buy it.
Very thought-provoking and interesting. The no-morality-without-God argument reminds me of the no-education-without-school argument. Both are spurious: the God-dictated morality has resulted in inhumanity, cruelty, and mine-is-better-than-yours thinking, while over 100 years of compulsory schooling has led to a declining literacy rate and a public more concerned with consumption than with more deeply human experience. I think the crux of your argument lies in the statement that it is “a reasonable justification for any compassionate person to choose to behave morally.” We may search in vain for “any compassionate person.” Look at the Middle East if you will, look at our extavagent expeditures on weapons, and look at our politicians, whose only concern is to get re-elected, to hell with social justice and compassion for our fellow creatures.
Thank you for your thoughts, Toms and God.
TomM: Fair enough, I’m willing to accept that there is an element of faith required to believe that happiness is better than misery. But I think it is a different kind of faith than the religious style. In the case of believing happiness is better than misery, I think it is as self-evident as any alleged truth could be based on our experience (other than perhaps “I think therefore I am,” “1 + 1 = 2,” and “X or not X”), and I think it is perfectly reasonable to think it’s true based upon that experience. It is, I think, a tiny faith step compared to the leap of faith required to actively believe in a higher power for which, as far as I know, we’ve seen no evidence that would pass any scientific testing.
For me, that kind of faith does require some reasons/evidence to justify it, and so I can see why the religious crowd are trying to find some, but I think they have failed thus far. This argument in particular that I’m referring to (their claim that our apparent morality proves the existence of God) is, I think, a complete affront to reason as they have failed to show why morality (or at least the appearance of it) could not have arisen without a higher power.
God: Hmm, if you don’t accept my fairly basic argument, it makes me question that you’re as all-knowing as promised. And, if you’re not all-knowing, then what other claims about you (such as, for instance, your existence) might also be questionable? 😉
TomD: I’m not as pessimistic as you are as I think there are examples of compassion (even within politicians) all around us.
I also enjoyed your clever attempt to bring me into your anti-school team by suggesting a similarity between my argument here and your argument there. I’ll take it as a compliment that you think they’re similar, even if I’m not convinced. 🙂
I’m surprised that you’re dissatisfied with the standard of responses made by the atheist crowd (or whoever) to date. I’ve read several very compelling and detailed (not to mention similar to yours). I’ll dig them up and post for your perusal.
Perhaps you meant to say that you had yet run across any responses you found sated you? How exhaustive was your search? 🙂
Thanks Tarrin. I haven’t searched for this moral argument in particular. Instead, I have simply YouTube searched for debates between non-theists and theists. I’ve witnessed Christopher Hitchens (most often since he’s so addictive to listen to), Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett represent the non-theists against various theists; in most occasions, the theists have brought up this morality-proves-God argument, and I have found my atheist friends to be simplistic (or at least incomplete) in their replies. For the most part, they just say that, “Of course we can have morality without God!” or “We don’t need God to tell us right from wrong!” and they sometimes give examples of people doing good without God, but their arguments tend not to go beyond these declarations. In Hitchens’s case, he has many times stated that the religious argument is “insulting” to atheists. I don’t see how that’s relevant to the debate.
The closest (to my mind) to being on point has been Richard Dawkins, who – in my viewings – very briefly mentioned that there is evidence that moral fibre could have evolved in us, but even he didn’t spend much time there. I’m sure all of these writers and others make compelling (to my requirements) arguments against Divine Command Theory, but I have yet to see them do it in the many televised debates in which I’ve witnessed them performing. And I think that’s interesting because it means that, even if they’re aware of the simple logical argument against Divine Command Theory that is taught in university, they either don’t feel that it’s as significant as other (less logic-based) arguments when the chips are down, or they don’t think the audience will be compelled by it. Both I think are interesting psychological/sociological findings that justify me adding this blog to the discussion.
Feel free to post the essays you have in mind. I wasn’t claiming my argument against Divine Command Theory was original, only that it is under-represented, and so I am pleased to support any attempts to illuminate this specious thinking about our species.
I like this, Seth. Crisp and clear. Your point about the problem of supposing God’s rules are right because he is stronger than us reminds me of the problem with the “Do what God wants and go to Heaven” exhortation. If you only do what is right in order to be rewarded or avoid being punished, it sort of undercuts any claim you might otherwise have to virtue.
Thank you, Auntie Lee! That means a lot coming from a verified philosopher! And nicely put re the irony of the “morality” that comes with rewards that may have provoked it.