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THE FREE EXPUNGE OF IDEAS IV: Nothing To See Here

“A person who only knows their own side of an argument knows little of that.”

—SethBlogs paraphrasing social psychologist and Heterodox Academy co-founder, Jonathan Haidt, paraphrasing philosopher and free speech defender, John Stuart Mill.

THE FREE EXPUNGE OF IDEAS SERIES:

I: I MAY AGREE WITH WHAT YOU SAY BUT I’LL FIGHT TO THE DEATH YOUR RIGHT TO SAY IT.
II: NO QUESTIONS ASKED

III: ONE OPINION FITS ALL
IV: NOTHING TO SEE HERE ( you are here)
V: DEFINE YOUR WAY TO INFALLBILITY (1 of 2)
VI: THE INFALLIBILITY CLOAK (2 of 2)
VII: THE SHAME OF THE GAME 


Previously in this NEW FREE EXPUNGE OF IDEAS series, I have written about the power of political correctness to suppress speech via the magnitude of its proponents’ outrage and calls for punishment of those who stray from “acceptable” opinion. In this episode of THE FREE EXPUNGE OF IDEAS, I will examine the argument of a scholar who defends the increasing powers of political correctness.


On June 21st, I overheard an interview on CBC’s The 180, in which interviewer Jim Brown asked a gender studies’ grad student, Zaren Healey White, whether Canadian universities have become too politically correct at the expense of free academic thought. The conversation had the veneer of a serious philosophical discussion, but to my ear, it evaded the most troubling aspects of limiting free speech at the behest of ideology, however well-meaning such measures may claim to be.

Thus, I sent a message to The 180, articulating some serious issues that I thought were missed in the discussion. Since it has now been two weeks, and I have not heard back, I offer that letter here.


NOTE: The transcript of the interview is available as the first comment on this post. I won’t be offended if you listen to or read the interview before taking in my reply.


Dear Mr. Brown:

I enjoy your show and interview style. Your attempts to unearth new perspectives in our little group think world is admirable.

In keeping with your mission, I would like to provide a 180 perspective on your 180 interview with Memorial University Gender Studies Masters student, Zaren Healey White, in regard to her contention that increasing political correctness in Canadian universities is a positive evolution.

Your guest was articulate and charismatic, and yet she sidestepped significant problems with her ideology.

When you asked Ms. Healey White to explain how she defines political correctness, she said:

“I just basically mean things that I think are values that I think we should value. So basically it’s not political correctness for its own sake, it’s that ‘Let’s be empathetic, sensitive, and aware—let’s be aware of language and how the words we use could impact people.”

Empathy, sensitivity, and awareness all sound like nice goals to strive for in theory, but in practice who gets to decide which language and opinions pass the test? As much as Ms. Healey White and her colleagues may have good intentions and talented brains, there are lots of smart and kind people who disagree with their diagnoses.

As the late journalist and intellectual Christopher Hitchens argued:

“Who is going to decide?… Who will you appoint? Who will be the one who says, ‘I know exactly where the limit [on free speech] should be. I know how far you can go. And I know when you’ve gone too far. And I’ll decide that? Who do you think, who do you know, who have you heard of, who have you read about in history who you would give that job?”

To my eye, gender scholars such as Ms. Healey White are currently the leading arbiters of politically correct speech in university culture, and it is they who teach the students who subsequently demand increasing “sensitivity” in academic discussion. So, when we give into student protests and limit who can speak and what can be said at universities, we are allowing a small group of gender scholars to have incredible power over all academic discussion.

This is not merely a theoretical speculation. Gender studies ideology has made some scary changes to the definition of sexual consent on university campuses, including the new notion that participants—especially female participants—cannot consent while intoxicated. Meanwhile, at the University of Ottawa, after two male hockey players were accused of sexual assault, the entire hockey team was suspended for a year. Those who criticize such repressive and autocratic justice are treated as pariahs by the gender studies collective.

This means that gender studies leaders design strange new rules of justice but will not accept feedback from those not accredited by them to speak on such matters. For instance, when erudite and polite critics of feminism such as Dr. Warren Farrell, Dr. Janice Fiamengo, Dr. Paul Nathanson, and Dr. Katherine Young have attempted to speak at Canadian universities, they have been denounced by feminist protestors as “hate speakers,” “rape apologists,” and “misogynists.” While the students had a right to these accusations, they should not be lionized for such hostile (and baseless) behavior, which inhibits legitimate discussion. Moreover, in some of those cases, the protestors blocked entrances to their opponents’ talks and pulled fire alarms, thus proving themselves literally closed to criticism.

Far from advocating compassion for those who see the world differently, gender scholars seem to allow no room for “error” amongst those with whom they disagree. Once someone says the “wrong” thing, they are not merely criticized, they are called to be excommunicated from their careers. Such chilling results surely give pause to others who might not agree with every commandment of gender scholarship but don’t want to lose their livelihood over it.

And note that such restrictions in current university speech is not just about limiting vicious words but also traumatic content. “Trigger warnings,” which began in gender studies, are becoming an expectation of university professors when they engage in material that students might find challenging or provocative. The theory behind this strange practice is that the warning protects the students who may suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder from being further traumatized. Again, this sounds compassionate on the surface, but in reality it is based on speculation that traumatized students will be triggered by content that reminds them of their harmful experiences. According to philosopher Christina Hoff Sommers, who has reviewed the scientific literature, there is no psychological evidence for this conclusion; in fact, quite the opposite, because students who are never exposed to content similar to their trauma have little opportunity to get free of it. Thus, instead of protecting students from harm, it gives additional power to the trauma, while demonizing discussion about it.

Meanwhile, even if trigger warnings were psychologically justified and there were an objective way to censor disrespectful language without limiting ideas, there is a double standard in favour of protecting gender studies from [being criticized for] its own sometimes hostile ideology. For all her calls for “valuing the inherent dignity of people and caring about them, and caring about their lives and their experiences,” notice that Healey White more than once dismissed critics of political correctness as “privileged.” For instances:

“I haven’t come across a lot of marginalized people who have a problem with political correctness. It seems to be people who have a lot of privilege who say, ‘Well I’m used to being able to say what I want, and I want to keep saying it.’”

And:

“I feel like the people leveraging the critiques that the students are too sensitive are the people that have benefitted from getting to say whatever they want, and not having to worry too much about oppression.”

How does Ms. Healey White know whether such critics have privilege or not? Generally, privilege is shorthand for “white,” “male,” and/or “heterosexual,” which of course is not exactly treating people of such blasphemous traits with empathy, sensitivity, and awareness: instead it paints all such people with the same insult: regardless of the individual circumstances in your life, you have, by definition, been privileged by your biological traits, and so therefore we cannot take your perspective as seriously as ours.

Such blanket wielding of the term “privilege” is bigotry personified. I won’t presume that Ms. Healey White is motivated by such mean-spirited intentions, but nevertheless she is capitalizing on a currently en vogue expression that carries with it a lot of vicious baggage.

Moreover, even if we assume the veracity of Ms. Healey White’s almost-impossible-to-verify notion that most of those who criticize political correctness have never experienced oppression (Ayaan Hirsi Ali being, I guess, an aberration), how does that prove their contentions incorrect? In philosophical argument, ad hominem claims (i.e. arguments against the traits of a person instead of their argument) are considered irrelevant. An individual can be both personally flawed and possessing of a good intellectual argument simultaneously, so by definition the person’s traits cannot prove or disprove the validity of their argument.

For instance, even if I defend free speech solely for my own selfish enjoyment of saying whatever I want (as Healey White suggests), it may be the case that my defence of free speech is still, inadvertently, correct. Meanwhile, even if gender studies students, who are mostly women, focus primarily on women’s rights over men’s rights, it’s possible that the feminist conclusions they draw are valid. The best way to determine the answer to those questions is to look at the arguments we all put forward, and examine them on their merits.

Sincerely,
Seth McDonough


REMINDER: The transcript of the interview is available as the first comment on this post.


THE FREE EXPUNGE OF IDEAS SERIES:

I: I MAY AGREE WITH WHAT YOU SAY BUT I’LL FIGHT TO THE DEATH YOUR RIGHT TO SAY IT.
II: NO QUESTIONS ASKED

III: ONE OPINION FITS ALL
IV: NOTHING TO SEE HERE (you were just here)
V: DEFINE YOUR WAY TO INFALLBILITY (1 of 2)
VI: THE INFALLIBILITY CLOAK (2 of 2)
VII: THE SHAME OF THE GAME

WIRED FOR OFFENCE

“Offensive, inappropriate, completely unacceptable.”

Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada.

“I’m at a loss for words on the chosen verbiage that the General used… It is not something that I agree with and it’s not something I appreciate, not in senior management.”

Lisa Raitt, Canadian Transport Minister.

“Completely wrong and totally unacceptable… the military brass simply don’t get it.”

Thomas Mulcair, NDP Leader of Canada.

“General Lawson should be immediately dismissed.”

Justin Trudeau, Liberal Leader of Canada.

Recently Canadian media, politicians, and feminists harmonized their outrage because the Canadian Chief of Defence, General Thomas Lawson, gave a controversial answer to a question regarding why there is apparently still a significant problem with sexual harassment in the Canadian Military.*

*The problem is asserted in a report by retired Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps.

Lawson’s uproar-provoking comments landed during an interview with the CBC’s Peter Mansbridge:

MANSBRIDGE: It’s 2015, why is [sexual harassment in the military] still an issue?

LAWSON: First of all, it’s a terrible issue. It’s one that disturbs the great majority of everyone in uniform, and yet we’re still dealing with it. It would be a trite answer, but it’s because we’re biologically wired in a certain way and there will be those who believe it is a reasonable thing to press themselves and their desires on others. It’s not the way it should be.

MANSBRIDGE: What do you mean by that? Biological?

LAWSON: What I mean by that, is that we are men and women in uniform. Much as we would very much like to be absolutely professional in everything we do, and I think by and large we are, there will be situations and have been situations where, largely men will see themselves as able to press themselves onto our women members.

During the rest of this almost 18-minute interview, General Lawson articulated that he wants to stop sexual harassment in the military, and has taken steps toward that end (such as requesting from Justice Deschamps the very report that provoked Mansbridge’s question, and then accepting her recommendations); nevertheless, Canadian media, politicians, and feminists have attacked his metaphor of “bad wiring” as offensive, behind-the-times, and proof that Lawson doesn’t think sexual harassment is a serious issue.

“General Lawson,” said Julie Lalonde an advocate against sexual assault who claims she was harassed by soldiers when she was invited to give them a workshop on sexual assault “…is giving this really weak response saying we don’t have a problem and, when we do, we can’t do anything about it because it’s biologically determined.”

That’s a grand assumption of Lawson’s meaning there, and one that is contradicted throughout the interview in which General Lawson expressed repeatedly that it’s a problem he is attempting to tackle.

So what’s providing the foam for these outraged mouths? What’s gotten Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau calling for the General to be fired even though the undeniable content of his message was aimed at reducing sexual harassment in the armed forces?

On first pass, it seems that the offence is derived from a belief that General Lawson is denying the moral responsibility of harassers (i.e. they can’t help how they were wired, so how could we hold them accountable for their actions?). But such an interpretation can’t stand the light of scrutiny. We don’t have control over the environmental factors that influenced the construction of our characters either. Every person is a collage of biological and environmental influences. Morality is a measure of the decisions each human makes regardless of the relative percentage that ingredients versus cooking played in forming them.

Thus, I suspect that the true source of feminist angst here is derived from the fact that General Lawson hinted at being on the politically no-longer-acceptable side of the nurture vs. nature debate.

It is a dispute that has a long and intriguing history in literature and science; we don’t know for sure exactly what percentage Mother Nature and Father Nurture have in creating our personalities, so we’re all entitled to our best guesses on the subject just as so many philosophers and novelists have before us.

Unfortunately for Lawson, though, he may not have realized that it is currently intellectually illegal in Canada to hold nature to account for bad acts whenever feminism has a stake in the discussion. You see, on the question of nature vs. nurture, most feminists argue that the nurture of our allegedly patriarchal and misogynistic society (see “rape culture”) is to blame for any mistreatment of women, as well as all general gender differences in wealth and power.

It doesn’t matter to the media or the politicians that both Lawson and feminists assume that harassing behaviour is ingrained by a particular force, and that both argue that the resulting harassment is immoral and harmful, and should be condemned and combatted. Given that Lawson seems to think that the ingraining happened earlier than feminists assert, his remarks have been designated irredeemable.

Of course, if one digs past the precariousness of holding an opinion on psychological causes that differs with the feminist autocratic line, one can see that—regardless of nature and nurture’s relative influence—sexual harassment is equally as immoral and harmful. But, for most politicians, digging past said precariousness would have been precarious, itself, so they stuck (as vaguely as they could) to their favourite phrases of outrage. No politician that I heard was willing to take on the task of telling us why a “nature” over “nurture” explanation for the existence of jerks was philosophica non grata.

Instead, they relied on the general population and feminists to fill in the blanks in their anger. And, since the media is either too indoctrinated or too terrified to ask why the politicians were so offended (for fear, I suspect, of then being accused of not being offended enough, themselves) the politicians were able to hold vapid in their responses to General Lawson’s remarks.

Moreover, after General Lawson officially apologized for what he called his “unhelpful comments that were conjecture that really did serve no purpose, and, in fact, clouded the very strong efforts that we have going forward” and reiterated that he was in no way suggesting “there is any excuse for any sexual misconduct by anyone in uniform,” the politicians were wary of accepting his contrition, and so continued to condemn him without providing content for their condemnation.

Liberal Defence Critic Joyce Murray stated:

“I thought it was very disappointing that he just repeated some lines several times that didn’t get to the heart of the matter. And from my perspective he has an unfortunate, very archaic belief that, it sounds like an excuse for why there is sexual harassment and abuse in the Canadian armed forces.”

(This confuses me. The General retracted the offending claim, and said it was supposition that he shouldn’t have said. He focussed directly on the problem language and said that it was not useful in the discussion of harassment, a problem which he stated he was committed to tackling. Moreover, he explicitly said that there is never an excuse for harassment by anyone under his command. What more was required to count as dealing with “the heart of the matter”? I can’t help wondering if Ms. Murray had her rejection ready before the General attempted his apology.)

NDP Defence Critic Jack Harris went further:

“I don’t really think it was an apology. I think he obviously had to try to backtrack on what was said because it was so outrageous and perceived as being such by every woman in the country I can guarantee you, but also by most men.”

(Wow, Mr. Harris, you don’t mind speaking for all women? Regardless, note how Harris is relying on the audience to fill in the details of his undefined outrage. Harris says all women and most men are offended? Well then it must be offensive!)

The nature (or should I say nurture?) of how this story played itself out is concerning. The CBC radio reports I heard only quoted the problematic “biological wiring” passage, providing almost none of the content which would have demonstrated the progressive heart of Lawson’s message. The reports then jumped to the “offended” politicians describing how upset they were, without ever apparently being pressed to say why. It was a scary example of groupthink. Since none of the media or politicians were willing to stray from the Politically Correct party line, we the observers were expected to assume that they had all vetted Lawson’s interview, and unanimously found him morally wanting, thus leaving us with no reason to be skeptical.

Western society is aware generally, I think, that political correctness subdues the language one can use in public if one wants to have a career in public. However, I don’t think we’re realizing how scary the implicit feminist censorship has become. Feminists will march not just against politically incorrect language (i.e. against those making “offensive” word choices), but also politically incorrect facts (i.e. against those “offensively” quoting studies that disagree with feminist conclusions), and now politically incorrect opinions about human psychology.

As much as feminists may feel they have the answer on the nurture vs. nature debate, would the media mind asking scientists if the facts are as clear as feminists insist? Even if it is, I see no evidence that General Lawson drew problematic human resources policies from his “unacceptable” belief.

(If Lawson’s claim about biological wiring could be shown to link up with an unwillingness to act on the problem—perhaps he might have said something like, “You can’t fight nature!”—then I think the feminist critics would have had a case to ask for his removal, but instead, based on his entire testimony, the “biological wiring” comment was essentially a placeholder to represent people who are predisposed to bad behaviour—bad behaviour which he clearly stated he was intent on attacking.)

Most scary of all is that the media and government are now complicit with the feminist policing of thought and language. As I’ve argued many times, most professional media in Canada are either afraid or ideologically unwilling to criticize feminist “research” or ideas. Even their most baffling claims—such as arguing that general safety advice from police during a crisis is a form of “victim-blaming”—go unchecked by the media. (I am not suggesting the media should disagree with the feminists—that’s not their role either: I’m only asking that they occasionally check the feminist “facts” and opinions with some critical questions.)

Meanwhile, the politicians, wafflers by nature, rarely stand up to the Feminist Ministry of Propaganda either, and in this case are joining in on the furor in a rare instance of all-party consensus. (They can’t agree on reducing pollution to save the planet, but when the leader of our military has an unpopular opinion about how jerks are formed, they all chant in the same direction.)

The only way we can have adult, content-heavy conversations about these important topics is if we allow our leaders (media, political, and otherwise) to explore them without fear that scarlet letters will be thrown at them every time they utter a sentence that sounds like it might not match politically correct dogma. If feminists are right about an issue, then surely they can win the argument with content instead of demonizing their opponents by leaping to the most inflammatory interpretations of them. Meanwhile, if feminists are ever wrong (or even partly wrong), then the only way we can expose their erroneous ideas is if the rest of us are allowed to freely join their settled conversations.

THE PROBLEM WITH “RAPE CULTURE” CULTURE

Rape culture” is a feminist theory which suggests that our institutions and social mores tend to tacitly (and sometimes explicitly) condone and/or normalize rape. I don’t object to naming an alleged cultural phenomenon as shorthand to identify a collection of forces (real or perceived) that one is trying to illuminate. The trouble with rape culture rhetoric, however, is that acceptance of the term’s validity has been treated by “with us or against us” feminists as a morality test, wherein you either agree to the scary assertion without question, or you’re “a rape apologist.”

Recently, Rolling Stone writer Sabrina Rubin Erdely apologized for not following standard journalistic practice before publishing a spurious article (that has since been retracted by the magazine) regarding an alleged gang rape in a fraternity house at the University of Virginia.

“The past few months,” she said, “since my Rolling Stone article ‘A Rape on Campus’ was first called into question, have been among the most painful of my life. Reading the Columbia account of the mistakes and misjudgments in my reporting was a brutal and humbling experience. I want to offer my deepest apologies: to Rolling Stone’s readers, to my Rolling Stone editors and colleagues, to the U.V.A. community, and to any victims of sexual assault who may feel fearful as a result of my article.”

As some critics have pointed out, she did not apologize to the fraternity house and its members who likely suffered in her undue process. I submit that this imbalance in her apology is consistent with the sort of journalistic biases that might have inspired her troubled article in the first place: we live in a “rape culture” culture. That is, we live in a philosophical world where “rape culture” is all-too-often assumed to be ubiquitous, which in turn causes the notion of “believe the victims” to be celebrated as the mantra of the virtuous, while due process is discarded as a weapon of the patriarchy.

Notice, for instance, that feminists condemn skepticism towards the terrifying and widespread feminist claim that approximately one of five American students will be sexually assaulted (critics argue the number is closer to one in forty). As I discuss in my post Freedom From Speech, when critics of controversial feminist data have attempted to speak at Canadian universities in the last few years, they have been protested as hate-speakers, and in some cases their talks were disrupted by feminist demonstrators pulling fire alarms.

“I don’t agree with the fire alarms pulled,” said feminist and motivational speaker, Rachel Décoste, in regard to attempts to mute Dr. Janice Fiamengo and her blasphemous criticism of modern feminism, “but when somebody says that the statistics that we’ve been based on forever are wrong, and therefore rape is not as much of an issue as it should be, I think that draws laughter, if not crying, because it’s just so preposterous. So, if [Dr. Fiamengo] wants to speak, that’s fine, but she doesn’t get to have the forum of our publicly funded universities, paid for by my and your taxes to disseminate that information that’s just not right.”

Décoste (along with all-too-many feminist advocates) seems to want the controversial one in five statistic to be cemented into law and never questioned. This kind of aversion to criticism is “rape culture” culture. If you don’t agree with feminist conclusions, you apparently deserve what you get.

Thus, for many journalists, politicians, and academics, the notion of criticizing assumptions of rape culture surely feels like a career-endangering maneuver. Indeed, it seems to me that most such professionals tend to play it safe and not criticize feminist “research” and advocacy, which in turn allows feminists to reside unfettered in a special branch of study that, like “Christian Science,” moulds the data to fit their theories instead of the other way around. (Who, after all, is going to stop them?)

I believe the key to releasing Western society from “rape culture” culture lies in the hearts and pens of the press. Journalists must reclaim their right and responsibility to critically report on settled feminist topics.

Philosopher and critic of what she called “gender feminism” and its supplanting of “equity feminism,” Christina Hoff Sommers previewed the problem of journalistic credulity (in regard to gender feminist assertions) in her 1994 work, Who Stole Feminism?

In the preface, she describes a variety of credulous reporters who apparently cited dubious feminist claims without checking the sources behind them. For instance, after several notable publications reported a false feminist assertion that battery was the leading cause of birth defects in the United States, Dr. Sommers contacted, among others, a hoodwinked reporter from Time Magazine. Says Sommers:

“The first thing she said was ‘That was an error.’ She sounded genuinely sorry and embarrassed. She explained that she is always careful about checking sources, but this time, for some reason, she had not” (page 14).

In Who Stole Feminism?, Sommers asks her readers a vital question:

“Why was everybody so credulous? Battery responsible for more defects than all other causes combined? More than genetic disorders such as spina bifida, Down syndrome, Tay-Sachs, sickle-cell anemia? More than congenital heart disorders? More than alcohol, crack, or AIDS—more than all these things combined? Where were the fact-checkers, the editors, the skeptical journalists?” (pages 14-15).

Sommers’ description of otherwise earnest reporters relinquishing their journalistic training when encountering feminist dogma should have warned us of the “rape culture” culture we are surrounded by today.

In her apology for the Rolling Stone article, Sabrina Rubin Erdely says:

“Over my 20 years of working as an investigative journalist—including at Rolling Stone, a magazine I grew up loving and am honored to work for—I have often dealt with sensitive topics and sources. In writing each of these stories I must weigh my compassion against my journalistic duty to find the truth. However, in the case of Jackie and her account of her traumatic rape, I did not go far enough to verify her story. I allowed my concern for Jackie’s well-being, my fear of re-traumatizing her, and my confidence in her credibility to take the place of more questioning and more facts. These are mistakes I will not make again.”

“Ultimately,” the story’s editor, Sean Woods confirms, “we were too deferential to our rape victim; we honored too many of her requests in our reporting. We should have been much tougher, and in not doing that, we maybe did her a disservice.” (See the ninth paragraph of the “Failure and Its Consequences” section of the Columbia University report.)

I don’t doubt Erdely’s and Woods’ explanation that their compassion overtook their journalistic objectivity, and that they weren’t intentionally fabricating a story that could deeply hurt a lot of people. Let’s assume that, on topics not related to rape, Erdely and Woods have always proceeded with due diligence. We should be asking them what, then, was the distinguishing factor in this case (as opposed to other situations where their compassion might have also been piqued) that made them forgo their training and experience? Is it possible that they were influenced by “rape culture” culture to the point that they were less inclined to question and verify their source’s claims than they would have been when dealing with any other topic?

The good news is that Rolling Stone asked Pulitzer-Prize-winning journalist, Steve Coll, Dean of the Columbia School of Journalism, to investigate “what went wrong” in the reporting of this story. Such a willingness to open one’s process up to independent scrutiny is progress, I think. In that analysis, Coll, along with co-authors Sheila Coronel and Derek Kravitz, point out a series of apparent failures of verification by Erdely, along with the fact-checking and editorial teams at Rolling Stone. More importantly, they include in their analysis a possible inciting cause that might have fueled these mistakes.

“The problem of confirmation bias—the tendency of people to be trapped by pre-existing assumptions and to select facts that support their own views while overlooking contradictory ones—is a well-established finding of social science. It seems to have been a factor here. Erdely believed the university was obstructing justice. She felt she had been blocked. Like many other universities, UVA had a flawed record of managing sexual assault cases. Jackie’s experience seemed to confirm this larger pattern. Her story seemed well established on campus, repeated and accepted.” (See the seventh paragraph of the ‘I had a faith’ section of the report.)

The confirmation bias in this case strikes me as a symptom of “rape culture” culture. The report concedes, however, that:

“Of all crimes, rape is perhaps the toughest to cover. The common difficulties that reporters confront—including scarce evidence and conflicting accounts—can be magnified in a college setting. Reporting on a case that has not been investigated and adjudicated, as Rolling Stone did, can be even more challenging.” (See the first paragraph of the “For Journalists: Reporting on Campus Rape” section.)

Hopefully, Rolling Stone’s humiliating failure here does not dissuade the magazine and other publications from pointing their gaze at all aspects of campus culture (including daunting subjects such as rape and sexual assault). But, when they do, I hope they report the stories they find, instead of the narrative they’ve been taught to expect.

BYSTANDER BLAMING

Recently, I have noticed several public service announcements (for instance, The White Ribbon Campaign and my own BC Lions“Be more than bystander” offering) calling on male bystanders to defend potential female victims of crime.

I applaud the notion of encouraging people to look out for each other, but I find the moral framework for these campaigns to be troubling, especially when compared to our society’s current opposite expectations of victims.

The current bystander imperative is that, when someone (particularly a woman) is in danger, then you have an obligation to help by intervening (particularly if you’re a man) and/or contacting the police.

In contrast, the current victim expectation is that, when you have been a victim (particularly if you are a women and your assailant a man), you have no obligation to help future victims by telling the police about the crime.

Notice that, in the second case, feminist advocates suggest that asking female victims to come forward immediately after a crime occurs (giving police the best chance of catching the assailant, and reducing the violent criminal’s opportunities to repeat his evil) is a form of victim blaming. After all, say feminist advocates, “Women have the right to choose” whether they want to come forward, especially considering that “the justice system is so hard on female victims of crime.”

Of course women have the legal right to decide whether to come forward, but bystanders also have the legal right to decide whether to dive into a dangerous situation to help a stranger.

The more interesting and relevant question, then, is whether victims and bystanders have a moral obligation to help. I submit that, in both cases, the answer depends on the context of each individual situation.

I imagine five general moral categories:

(1) Morally supererogative*
(2) Morally right.
(3) Morally neutral.
(4) Morally wrong.
(5) Morally awful.

*Supererogative—meaning essentially to go above and beyond one’s duty—has been taken out of some dictionaries because it is considered an archaic term that is no longer in regular use. I hope it’s not also an archaic behaviour.

Where we locate both passive and active bystanders on such a moral ladder should be a function of the circumstances of each case. If the level of potential harm to the victim is significant, and the risk to a bystander who might intervene is non-existent, then not helping is, I believe, morally awful. For instance, if you’re on the fifth floor of your apartment building and you see someone being assaulted outside on the street, and you merrily watch without calling the police to help, then you’re likely not a good person. However, if you put yourself at risk by running down to fight off the assailant, then, in that case, you may be morally supererogative. Or, if you were to witness a mob hit, and you testified against the killer and consequently put yourself in mortal danger, then taking such a witness stand would also clearly be a morally heroic act.

Thus, I think it is encouraging that current bystander theory is asking people to aim for higher on our moral decisions. Instead of ignoring those in trouble, let’s try to help. At the very least, let’s alert someone or some agency such as the police who might be able to make a positive difference, and if you feel up to it, then intervene yourself.

However, as I argued in ATTACKING MEN, it makes me nervous that we seem to be expecting men to climb higher on this ladder as an obligation of our sex; that is, men are told they should intervene directly; if they don’t, they are often treated as complicit in the crime. This is dangerous talk. While I think it’s laudable for those who are most physically capable to try to help those less physically fortunate in an altercation, let us not forget that, when bystanders try to help, they can and have been injured or killed in their heroic efforts.

The aforementioned white ribbon campaign (which my BC Lions endorse) tells men:

“Don’t walk on by if you witness harassment or assault on the street or anywhere: assess the risk, then intervene and confront or diffuse the situation. If you need to, ask for help. Call 911.”

It turns out that not all men are experts in dealing with violence: many men don’t have the training to accurately assess risk, nor the skills to diffuse a situation; moreover, my BC Lions may be surprised to learn that not all male people are elite athletes possessing the physical aptitude that might make a confrontation with a potentially violent criminal a safe activity.

This is not to say that we shouldn’t celebrate those who do put themselves at risk for the sake of a stranger, but we ought to be careful to differentiate such moral heroism from obligation.

(Often I hear stories where a man has attempted to assault a women, and male bystanders have intervened; they are rarely celebrated for such actions, but instead are treated as people simply doing their duty.)

In contrast, note how we treat female victims who are, in a sense, bystanders of future crime by the same assailants. (We know that most violent attackers victimize more than one person, so when victims don’t tell the police what has happened, they are leaving future victims to fend for themselves.) In the Jian Ghomeshi case, women who say they waited many years to come forward with accusations against the former talk radio superstar were described as “courageous” by many observers. It is a strange label for a group who (assuming they are telling the truth) did nothing for a decade to help possible ongoing victims.

One such belated accuser, who was interviewed on CBC’s As it Happens, said she didn’t present her case initially because she’d seen an alleged victim of a different crime severely criticized on the internet, and she said, “That would have happened to me.” However, she explained, she was now presenting her case because she was angry that current alleged Ghomeshi victims were asked why they waited so long to make their accusations.

If she’s telling the truth, then on her own testimony, she’s a significantly selfish person (especially if we use bystander expectation theory to asses her). She refused to help other potential victims because she didn’t want to be criticized (that is, she valued (A) her own reticence to receive a negative reaction from trolls on the internet, over (B) other women’s physical safety); and then, she only decided to testify because she was offended by a politically incorrect question—not because she wanted to help the alleged victims, nor to bring justice to the alleged assailant so that he couldn’t hurt anyone else, but because she was affronted by someone asking a simple “Why?” question.

And note that As It Happens host, Carol Off, did not venture a single hard question towards this self-centred approach to justice. I don’t mean to demonize the alleged victim in this case. Lots of people are as self-interested as she appears to be, but we clearly have a double moral standard where alleged female victims are treated as heroes even when they testify so late in the timeline that their alleged evidence is corrupted beyond usefulness, while we treat men who risk their safety to intervene as simply doing their duty.

Why don’t we ask everyone to at least do the morally right thing, and if they’re up for it, the morally exemplary thing? That is, if you’re a bystander, then it would be morally right to help as much as you can without putting yourself in danger; and if you are willing to risk your safety to help someone else, that would be morally great of you. Similarly, if you’re a victim, it would be morally right to come forward, unless such help would put you in danger, in which case testifying would become morally wonderful of you.

Admittedly, where we draw the line as to what constitutes danger, or at least harm, in coming forward may be tricky: a female victim—who has been taught by feminists that all female victims will be re-victimized by the justice system—may sincerely believe that her life will automatically be ruined if she testifies. So I do not mean to suggest that all silent victims are morally culpable, but we need our media investigators to start considering the possibility that in certain cases even a victim might be morally troubled if they don’t try in any way to help future victims.

I don’t know how daunting it is for female victims of violence to come forward. We know, from feminists’ previous work in propaganda, that feminist victims’ advocates cannot be trusted to draw an accurate picture of police/victim relations; after all, it is an intrinsic aspect of their ideology and best interests (for future funding) to always tell the most bleak tale they can.

From feminists we only have their often anecdotal assurance that female victims of crime are “up against it” when they go through the police and justice system. No member of the Canadian media that I’ve heard has ever challenged the assertion, not just that police abuse victims sometimes, but that every female victim will suffer any time she pursues justice. And, as this wild fire accusation against our police and legal system has spread, it has become an unassailable fact as opposed to a shocking indictment that demands an impartial investigation.

Nevertheless, even if, as I suspect, modern police mistreatment of female victims has been greatly exaggerated, this does not mean that some female victims have not been traumatized by police and/or the justice system; moreover, given that feminists so constantly and dogmatically tell victims (via the media) that going through the process is “as bad as” suffering the violent crime itself, it is understandable that some women—persuaded by these terrifying claims of ubiquitous police misogyny—are tempted to leave justice to fate.

Thus, I think it’s time to resist this unwavering narrative that the justice system hates women, and in turn, the corollary notion that that we ought not to expect any help from victims, especially female victims, in our pursuit of violent criminals.

Recently, on a metro Vancouver Skytrain, a man allegedly groped a woman. A second woman says she checked on the alleged victim to see if she was okay, but didn’t receive a reply. So the bystander took a picture of the alleged assailant, and reported the alleged crime to the police. The police were then able to apprehend the alleged assaulter, who apparently they had met before, which seemed to give credence to the bystander’s claim. The police, however, were not able to find the alleged victim, and so, given they needed her corroborating testimony to charge the suspect with a crime, they have gently but publicly asked her to come forward (letting her know she will be treated respectfully).

This seems to me to be a case in which, if the incident happened as the bystander describes, she should be considered to be someone who was morally heroic, because she tried to directly help at the time of the alleged crime (putting herself at risk), while the alleged victim seems morally wrong for not coming forward to help future potential victims. Nevertheless, the bystander has been treated by the media as a neutral character in this story, whereas the police have been condemned by victims’ rights groups for expecting a victim to speak up.

“It’s her choice whether she wants to come forward,” is the common feminist mantra. “She has the right not to speak up if she doesn’t want to.”

Again, yes, of course, she has the right not to defend future victims, but that doesn’t make it morally right to be unwilling to help. One feminist victims’ advocate explained again that women have many obstacles to overcome in the justice system, and so it is wrong to pressure any woman to talk to the police. And so once again the feminist advocates are encouraging victims not to help each other, and instead to demand that police and bystanders do more. In this case, if the crime happened, the victim would have had an ally, via the bystander’s testimony, that would surely have made a persuasive case for the justice system to seriously consider. So does she really have any moral justification not to help the police put away this alleged bad guy? Is the risk to her anywhere near the level of good she could do for society if she were to stand up?

Perhaps, as I’m sure many feminists would say, I just “don’t get it.” Maybe female victims suffer in the justice system as consistently and terribly as feminist advocates insist. But how can we know that if our media continue to shirk their responsibility to investigate such a claim? At present, most Western media simply do not ask feminist advocates critical questions; on the contrary, instead of recognizing that such feminists are devotees of a particular ideology (that, like any other, is fallible), they treat such biased sources as scientific experts whose startling statements need no skepticism.

Yet, if my suspicion of feminist exaggeration has any veracity, these so-called victims’ advocates are protecting assailants as much as they are their victims. By scaring victims into thinking that Western society and the justice system is out to get them, they encourage victims not to stand up for other victims. Who’s the bystander now?

GHOMESHI’S FEMINISM II: You’re Either With Us Or You “Don’t Get It”

SethBlogs does not believe in trial by faith even when applied to a preacher of the religion in question.

GHOMESHI’S FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FAITH-BASED JUSTICE

II: YOU’RE EITHER WITH US OR YOU “DON’T GET IT” (you are here)

III: BEYOND BELIEF


In the first episode of GHOMESHI’S FEMINISM I argued that Jian Ghomeshi has been tried and convicted in the media by the same uncritical uniformity of feminist thought that Mr. Ghomeshi, himself, so often exemplified when he flavoured CBC’s airwaves. I argued that, even though the persona of the former host would have supported the feminist assumption of guilt that he has now received from his former colleagues, he nevertheless deserves a right to a fair and legal hearing of the facts before he is thrown off the ship.

As evidence of the Canadian mainstream media’s indestructible desire to prove itself to be pro-women, and anti-Ghomeshi, consider a recent panel discussion on The Current, in which Anna Marie Temonti interviewed a balanced collective of feminists. The topic up for consensus was a question of whether the Ghomeshi scandal would be a breakthrough “watershed moment” for female victims, or would too many chauvinists still “not getting it” block the enlightenment?

Below is my resulting letter to The Current asking for a smidge of balance in their presentation of such discussions:

[Note: I have since re-listened to the broadcast and provided in square brackets below some specific quotes and points in the timeline of The Current discussion to verify my claims.]


Subject: Re Feminist discussion on Thursday: A friendly request from a listener who “doesn’t get it”

Dear Anna Maria Tremonti:

I was frustrated as I listened to your interview with three feminists on Thursday [November 6th] in regard to whether the Jian Ghomeshi scandal would be a breakthrough moment for women (and sexual assault victims in general).

Your three guests seemed to agree that the problem for [Western] women, in particular, was still towering over us, and that men need to get in the conversation and start to better understand the plight of women. I heard you respond with the phrase, “Some people still don’t get it,” and ask a question to the effect of, “Why would a man not want to protect women from violence?”

[Tremonti’s actual question at 15:11 was:

“But Joe you make the point that you realize that you know a lot more women than you realized who are up against this. We’re talking about, for men, we’re talking about women who are their partners, their mothers, their daughters, their sisters, why the disconnect? They would never want this to happen to their sister, but they look the other way if it’s happens to their neighbour?”

This is not just straw man argument: it’s a straw, psychopathic man argument.]

You may be surprised that I am a caring person who nevertheless found the discussion to be philosophically painful to listen to, not because I don’t like and worry about women, but because your guests seemed to be unwilling to contemplate the potential that good people might disagree with them. With respect, I propose that, when you say that anyone who questions a feminist argument “still doesn’t get it,” you’re dismissing those of us who may have thought carefully and compassionately about these topics and sincerely come to disagree with feminist theory.

There are critics of feminist orthodoxy (including “the factual feminist,” Christina Hoff Sommers) who have persuasively argued that much of feminist data regarding the prevalence of sexual assault (in the west) has been unscientifically inflated to support feminist ideology. [See Sommers’ Sexual Assault in America: Do  we know the true numbers.]

Before you stop reading, I am not suggesting that, because feminist numbers are problematic, we shouldn’t care deeply about female victims (and feel outrage toward their offenders), nor that we should stop trying to combat whatever number of sexual offenders there are. Instead, my contention is that the Western media is afraid to question feminist data, and that the consequence is unfortunate: feminists have little reason to be scientific and honest in their work. It’s simple human nature: in the absence of serious criticism, few of us will be as rigorous in our arguments as we would be if we knew our research would be genuinely challenged.

The result is a feminist advocacy movement which has painted a tilted landscape of Western culture in which women suffer much more than men. And yet, there are rumours that men are in trouble, too: as Sommers argues, men are more likely to kill themselves, be the victim of violence in general, be injured at work, and more. [See 3:55-4:20 of Sommers’ Emma Watson and the Future of Feminism  or 1:50-3:00 of Sommers’ Facts the media didn’t tell you.]

When your guests spoke about sexual violence, you noted that there are male victims of sexual violence, too, which was compassionate and open-minded of you. Nevertheless, the focus in the media seems most frequently to be on the type of violence directed more towards women. The disparity in female as opposed to male victims of sexual violence is then taken as proof that we live in a misogynistic society. However, if programs such as yours were to look as frequently, and with the same reasoning, at the type of violence more likely to hit men (such as random violence on the street), you might start to wonder whether we in fact live in a misandrist arena.

(Notice that, when women are victims of violence, national and local media often convene expert and/or survivor discussions to consider the problem of violence against women, but when men are the wounded parties, I have yet to hear mainstream media gather similar thought leaders and/or victims to talk about the particular dangers that men tend to encounter.)

While feminism, by its dictionary definition, may be simply about fighting for equal rights, in practice it is weighed down by a lot of philosophical dogma regarding how to achieve them. Thus, contrary to the claims of “You’re with us or against us” feminists, it is possible to agree with the ends proposed by feminists, but not the means they suggest for acquiring them. However, once again, it seems that mainstream media in Canada is terrified of questioning any branch of feminist leadership.

If you’re skeptical that feminist perspectives aren’t challenged in the media, consider, for example, how you responded to your guest when she told you that dealing with the justice system was a worse experience than being sexually assaulted. [The quote of this claim was played at 1:02-1:17, and then discussed per below at 11:15-15:00 and 16:37-17:03.]

To illustrate this shocking claim, she talked of feeling re-victimized when the parole officer of her former assailant told her that the offender, her ex-boyfriend, would like to apologize to her. She suggested that this was evidence that the parole officer was on the assailant’s “team” and not hers. But, instead of asking your guest why exactly that was evidence of such bias, you seemed to accept that her conclusion was self-evident. Another of your guests then pointed out that he imagined a lot of the listeners to the show wouldn’t understand why the parole officer’s behaviour was so inappropriate.

Please count me among the confused. There is a branch of social work called “restorative justice,” which seeks to help victims and rehabilitate assailants by connecting them in safe communication.

Is it not possible that there are people working in the field who care deeply about the victims and think that restorative justice is an effective means of helping those who have suffered (while simultaneously giving assailants a better understanding of the consequences of their violence on real people)?

(Moreover, what would have happened if the parole officer hadn’t told the victim of the apology offer? If your guest had found out about such protective behaviour later, I wonder if her feminist side would have argued that that too was demonstrating his patriarchal bias.)

Regardless, if your guest has an argument for why restorative justice is too hard on victims, I would be interested to hear her case, but I am surprised that you did you not ask her for details of why she was offended by the parole officer’s behaviour. Did you really think the basis for your guest’s controversial claim was so obvious that it needn’t be explained? Or is it possible that you didn’t ask because you were afraid that people might think that you “didn’t get it”?

(I ask that question not in an accusatory way, but instead to suggest the possibility that feminist ideology scares even the most strong-minded journalists into censoring their natural curiosity for fear that it might poke the dogma.)

Sincerely,
Seth McDonough (www.sethblogs.com)

P.S. If you’re even a smidge compelled by my argument, please consider contacting Erin Pizzey, who I understand started one of the first-ever women’s shelters, but generally disagrees with feminist theory in regard to therapy, and so would likely give you an interesting (and respectful) counter balance.


Thus far, to my everlasting surprise (sarcasm alert!), The Current has not replied to my email. However, on November 12th, they put on a show presenting male voices regarding violence against women.

Men who have been falsely accused, you ask? No, good one. It was, of course, a panel discussion (identified on CBC’s website under the prescriptive headline “Men need to get involved in the fight against sexism and misogyny in Canada”) regarding a white ribbon campaign that calls for men to stop hurting women.

I have no objection to advocating for the better treatment of others (I hate violence as much as the next pacifist), but I am weary of the omnipresent suggestions that (A) all men are culpable for the crimes of terrible men, and (B) we should rank our concern for victims of violence based on their gender.

I can understand that we may feel more protective of those who generally have fewer physical attributes with which to defend themselves, but when a man is murdered should it really matter to us that, in theory, he had a better chance of fighting back? Indeed, should we be even less bothered if it turns out he was a martial arts expert? I’m not saying that the vulnerability of certain people (or even groups of people) shouldn’t play into our discussions of violence in our society, but it would be refreshing if a mainstream broadcaster (especially a public broadcaster meant to represent all of us) would occasionally consider the possibility that being male doesn’t make one immune to danger, serious injury, and the psychological stress and trauma of each.


GHOMESHI’S FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FAITH-BASED JUSTICE

II: YOU’RE EITHER WITH US OR YOU “DON’T GET IT” (you were just here)

III: BEYOND BELIEF

GHOMESHI’S FEMINISM I: Faith-Based Justice

SethBlogs does not believe in trial by faith even when applied to a preacher of the religion in question.

GHOMESHI’S FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FAITH-BASED JUSTICE (you are here)

II: YOU’RE EITHER WITH US, OR YOU “DON’T GET IT”

III: BEYOND BELIEF


“I don’t know whether Jian Ghomeshi is guilty or not, and neither does anyone who wasn’t present if and when the alleged crimes occurred. If he is proven guilty, I will still be ashamed of how many Canadians have sacrificed a person’s right to a fair trial for the sake of proving their own feminist pedigree.”


Modern feminists are infamous for bullying their adversaries with the false dichotomy, “You either agree with feminist theory or you’re a misogynist.” Popular screenwriter and pop feminist Joss Whedon, for instance, tells those weary of being identified as feminists:

“There’s no fuzzy middle ground. You either believe that women are people or you don’t. It’s that simple.”

The intimidation has worked. When interviewing feminists, the otherwise serious Western media tend to disavow their traditional skepticism, criticism, or even cautiousness of agreement. After all, to imply a hint of incredulity regarding a shocking feminist statistic is (according to popular feminist rhetoric) to advocate for the very horrors their numbers claim to represent. I have ranted a few times in my Sethics vs. Misandry collection  against feminist-fearing journalists for bobbing their heads in adulation as feminist advocates have made baffling, illogical, and sometimes offensive statements. Perhaps the worst and yet most charming patsy was Jian Ghomeshi. He never heard a feminist argument he couldn’t cheer on with the most soft and inviting questions for the inflammatory claims to land on.

Ghomeshi’s style of “with us or against us” feminism is a bed that he must now lie in as allegations that he abuses women have provoked his former feminist friends to convict him without trial.

At first, many fans of Ghomeshi irrationally defended him on social media (i.e. they proclaimed his innocence without having direct interaction with the facts in the case). Recently, Angelina Chapin, Blogs Editor for The Huffington Post Canada, has written an eloquent piece entitled, “The Jian Ghomeshi Story Turned Us Into Social Media Fools,” in which she argues persuasively why it was wrong for anyone not involved in the case to assume that Ghomeshi was in the right. She aptly quotes a psychologist, Ann Friedman, who points out that drawing conclusions in such social media wars tends to leave us supporting the perspective with which we most identify.

Chapin counts herself among the too-quick-to-defend-Ghomeshi (although, to be fair, she never argued that he was innocent). It’s a noble admission from Chapin that her initial public reaction to Ghomeshi’s firing was one of emotion over reason. The trouble is that this confessed conclusion jumper is only criticizing the side that has tweeted in defence of Mr. Ghomeshi. Far from adding that no one but the alleged victims have the right to assume his guilt, she goes on to say:

“The Ghomeshi story has proved that we desperately need to have open dialogues about consent, sexual abuse and powerful figures.”

So apparently, while she was wrong to assume his innocence initially, she’s now right to imply that he’s guilty. Ms. Chapin’s transition from irrationally defending to irrationally accusing is right on trend.

I believe the general shift was provoked when Ghomeshi defenders asked why his accusers didn’t come forward at the time of the alleged assaults. It is a question that could be asked of delayed claims by victims in other crimes. After all, the longer one waits to tell the police of a crime, the more daunting it will be to prove, and so waiting not only hurts one’s own chances of finding justice, but also lessens one’s opportunity to protect future victims from the same trauma. Thus, given the counter-intuitive and problematic nature of delayed reporting, asking adults what caused them to wait may be useful to police in assessing the veracity of the complaints. However, if the crime is violent, and the alleged victim is female, feminists take this otherwise reasonable question as proof of misogyny.

And so, upon hearing the blasphemous question, the feminist army’s ears’ perked up. Quickly, they announced that the “Why did you wait?” question was tantamount to blaming the victim, and was further proof of our rape culture. This immediately terrified the press, and so the media commentators who might have been willing to stay neutral in this scandal cowered as they saw their political betters approaching.

Both of the radio stations (CBC and CKNW) that I follow, for instance, began to interview “experts” (i.e. feminist advocates) regarding sexual violence against women: they asked the advocates to explain why Ghomeshi’s “victims” would have waited to come forward. Thus the stations were officially abdicating neutrality as they assumed in their questions that the alleged victims must have had good reasons for announcing themselves belatedly.

If CKNW or CBC had asked, “In your judgement, why might these women have waited to come forward?” and then also interviewed an expert regarding false claims (perhaps asking, “In your judgment, what are the distinguishing symptoms in those rare cases where allegations have been proven to be false?”) the radio stations could have held onto their claims of objectivity. Instead, the broadcasters’ neutrality was now permanently in hiding.

Of course, given the initially aggressive defence from some of Ghomeshi’s fans, I understand why victims’ advocates may have felt compelled to defend delayed victim reporting by pointing out that accusing a celebrity of sexual assault may come with special challenges (especially given that we currently live a Troll’s paradise that may devour such accusers). But they could have said something to the effect of:

Please be careful of assuming facts about these alleged victims. In our experience, many victims are terrified to come forward when attacked, so the delay in their accusations is not necessarily evidence that they are not telling the truth.

Sadly, the victims’ advocates knew that such circumspection was unnecessary: after all, they recognized that no member of the media was going to raise a single eyebrow against their political claims.

For instance, on CBC Vancouver’s Early Edition, Dayla Israel, Manager of Victim Services for WAVAW (Women Against Violence Against Women) told host Rick Cluff that only “.8%” of claims of sexual assault lead to convictions. Cluff sounded appropriately baffled by the shocking number.

“Point eight?” he said.

Were he interviewing a person representing any other issue, he would likely have asked for details of how such startling numbers were derived. But Cluff was speaking to a feminist advocate so he did not question her.

Meanwhile, when the same advocate said that false claims of violence occur in under 1% of cases (the feminist implication being that they’re so rare that they’re not worth considering), Cluff was again deferential (just as his former colleague Ghomeshi had been many times before him) and did not ask:

“But how can we ever know what percentage of allegations are false? Instead, do you mean less than 1% of allegations are proven to be false?”

Almost as significantly, Cluff did not point out the conspicuous feminist double standard in how Israel was interpreting her data.  Consider the two cases:

CASE A:

PREMISE: A low percentage of accused men are proven to be guilty (of a crime).

CONCLUSION: Therefore, not enough men are being prosecuted.

CASE B:

PREMISE: A low percentage of accused women are proven to be guilty (of false accusations).

CONCLUSION: Therefore, not enough women are being believed.

In the latter case (against women), the results that have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt are depicted as identifying the maximum possible number of wrongdoers, whereas in the former case (against men), the results that are proven beyond the same reasonable doubt are implied to represent well below the minimum number of wrongdoers.

Thus, when statistics seem to support feminist theory, feminists portray them as bottled truth, but when the stats don’t fit their narrative, they reference them as proof of a biased system against women. It’s possible, of course, that they’re right that the system has significant internal biases against female victims of crime, but evidence is required beyond these one-sided interpretations of data. And the only way to push feminists into a neutral corner is if the media occasionally challenges their statements.

Instead, most media treat social justice agencies as truth beacons. The consequence is the same as it would be for an unchallenged politician. As with political parties, non-profit agencies have missions, which they’re naturally disposed to prop up by tweaking the data and information to best fit their narrative. That’s an unfortunate necessity of modern non-profit warfare, which can only be minimized with checks and balances such as skepticism from the press.

Meanwhile, with the critical press away from its desk, social media has continued to build its case against Ghomeshi. A petition, calling on former Q guests to “support the women,” (i.e. presume Ghomeshi’s guilt) has been signed by a variety of celebrities, including Shawn Majumder (of This Hour Has 22 Minutes), who stated:

“I have considered [Ghomeshi] a pal. However these allegations and even more, how he tried to use a statement to shame anyone in coming to speak the truth about his actions makes me lose all respect for him. I support every woman who has been dealt a blow. From him or anyone.”

Feminist and Canadian superstar author Margaret Atwood has also decided to lend her reputation to the modern-day McCarthyism. It’s baffling to see such a high-minded person add herself to the list of those unwilling to wait for Ghomeshi to be charged with, let alone convicted of, a crime before proclaiming his guilt.

Even more unnerving, several so-called friends of Ghomeshi have also helped themselves to a pre-trial guilty verdict. His former Moxy Fruvous bandmates stated:

“As former colleagues of Jian (our last show was in 2000), we are sickened and saddened by this week’s news. We had no inkling that Jian engaged in this type of behaviour… We abhor the idea of a sexual relationship of any sort being entered into without full consent from both parties and condemn violence against women in any form.”

While they don’t directly state that he’s guilty, they clearly imply so with their language regarding “this type of behaviour,” followed by a description of the illegal behaviour to which they’re heroically opposed.

Most egregiously, Owen Pallett, who claims to be a friend of Ghomeshi’s, said:

“I was challenged by a friend to say something about the recent allegations against Jian Ghomeshi. Jian is my friend. I have appeared twice on Q. But there is no grey area here. Three women have been beaten by Jian Ghomeshi.”

This post was made after only three anonymous accusations had been announced, and from it we can deduce that either (A) Pallett already had evidence that his alleged friend was guilty of criminal violence before these accusations came out, but didn’t do anything about it; or (B) he’s merrily convicting his friend of a crime without a trial. With friends like that, who needs a lynch mob?

Finally, Ruth Spencer, who says she’s a former girlfriend of Ghomeshi, has also announced that he’s guilty, because, although he never assaulted her during their relationship, he had some strange behaviours, which she’s now decided are proof that he was “grooming [her] for the same violence he inflicted on other women.”

According to Spencer, for instance, Ghomeshi had anxiety issues, so voila, let’s grab onto the trope of the socially awkward (and/or mentally ill) male as a symptom that he’s a violent sociopath, and we have ourselves a bigger Twitter following than ever before!

I have no idea whether Ghomeshi is guilty or not, and neither does anyone who wasn’t present if and when the alleged crimes occurred. If he is proven guilty, I will still be ashamed of how many Canadians have sacrificed a person’s right to a fair trial for the sake of proving their own feminist pedigree. Ghomeshi, the feminist whom they thought they knew on Q, would have been proud.

Jian Ghomeshi may turn out to have been the vicious abuser Margaret Atwood has already decided he is, but that will not retroactively justify this attack on his right to reasonable doubt. To paraphrase Mr. Whedon, There’s no fuzzy middle ground here. You either believe that everyone has the right to a fair trial or you don’t. It’s that simple.


GHOMESHI’S FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FAITH-BASED JUSTICE (you were just here)

II: YOU’RE EITHER WITH US, OR YOU “DON’T GET IT”

III: BEYOND BELIEF

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM III: Free Speech vs. Free Speech

SethBlogs is suspicious of any ideology that attempts to erase criticism and counterargument.

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH (you are here)


In my recent FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM posts, I describe what I believe have been disruptions to free expression in the last few years by so-called feminists on Canadian universities who not only protested, but also attempted to bar men’s and equal rights groups from presenting speakers who possessed counter-narratives to academic feminism. I referenced a debate on The Agenda with Steve Paikin, with English professor and feminist skeptic, Dr. Janice Fiamengo, and free speech advocate, Justin Trottier (National Policy Director at the Centre for Inquiry), arguing on the one side that the above-described campus feminists were indeed exhibiting actions that infringed on free thought, while their opponents in the discussion, feminist and philosophy professor Dr. Alice MacLachlan, along with feminist, writer, and activist Rachel Décoste, countered that the protests were beautiful examples of the sort of free expression that fuel free thought.


In this spin-off post, I’d like to examine a pair of contentions made by the MacLachlan-Décoste team, which I found to be logically objectionable.

(1) The “You benefitted from it” argument:

In trying to prove that the suppressing treatment that Fiamengo received on university campuses was, in fact, an example of free speech, MacLachlan points out that Fiamengo’s ideas may have received greater exposure as a result.

“I was only recently made familiar with Janice’s [Fiamengo’s] experiences,” MacLachlan said. “I had the chance to watch them on youtube. And what I saw warmed me. I saw people who cared very much about gender issues, some identifying as feminists, some identifying as men’s rights activists, vigorously, wholeheartedly, and determinedly engaging with each other. Yelling, not always being polite. And as a result, I know that Janice’s work has received a much wider audience, including a platform on this show. I think this is the very opposite of silencing and it’s how a society of free speech works.”

Later, Fiamengo asked MacLachlan “how [she] would feel if [she] were giving a talk and [she was] shut down by a group of protesters? Would [she] say, ‘This was a wonderful example of freedom of speech,’ if [she] never got to say [her] first sentence?”

This provoked MacLachlan to reiterate her argument that the protests had ultimately served Fiamengo well.

“I would certainly not frame it in terms of freedom of speech,” she said. “How I would feel is I would feel shocked. If that led to a much wider platform for my views, including an entire episode of The Agenda being dedicated to them, I’d probably be pretty pleased about the whole thing, and I suspect that’s the case for [Fiamengo] as well.”

This is a dangerous game of unintended consequences justifying troubling means. It may be the case that Fiamengo’s career has, in the long run, been enhanced by the discussion provoked by the troubling actions of these protestors; it’s also possible that Fiamengo’s reputation has been injured by the shameful and baseless accusations that she is a misogynist and a rape apologist. I have no idea whether, on the balance, Fiamengo has benefitted or not from these protests, but for the purpose of this discussion, I will stipulate that she has done well by them. However, such a result does not retroactively justify crimes and attempts to censor Fiamengo and other speakers.

The question in this debate is whether particular actions of the protestors were legitimate or not. The notion that some of their alleged victims inadvertently benefitted from their alleged crimes should have no weight whatsoever upon our assessment. Similarly, someone who is the victim of an assault may consequently receive positive public attention that offers them career opportunities that they might not have otherwise had. However, I hope that we all agree that such unintended proceeds do not justify the assault. I see no difference here.

(2) The “You started it” argument:

This one requires some context. In her defense of the notion of quelling Fiamengo’s public presence in universities, Décoste argued that Canadian civil rights do not promise her a platform.

“The charter of rights and freedoms guarantees freedom of expression,” she explained. “It doesn’t guarantee you the right to dispel your drivel, really just untruths, to impressionable minds with a mic, and amplifier, and an audience of impressionable students.”

Thus, she concluded that, while she technically disagreed with pulling fire alarms, it was not appropriate for Dr. Fiamengo to spread her counter-to-feminist-gospel ideas at a university of all places.

“I don’t agree with the fire alarms pulled,” she said, “but when somebody says that the statistics that we’ve been based on forever are wrong, and therefore rape is not as much of an issue as it should be, I think that draws laughter, if not crying, because it’s just so preposterous. So, if she wants to speak, that’s fine, but she doesn’t get to have the forum of our publicly funded universities, paid for by my and your taxes, to disseminate that information that’s just not right.”

Apparently, while Décoste may not agree with something as dangerous as fire alarm pulling, she does ask the state to pull a metaphorical alarm before such a scandalous talk.

Décoste’s philosophical opponent, Trottier, argued in reply that drivel-banning would be a tricky, because, strangely, not everyone would have the same definition of unworthy speech.

“These are public universities,” he said. “We all pay through tuition subsidies, that kind of thing, from the government. Many of us are students at these universities, and have differences of opinion. We all pay tuition to attend them. The thing, though, is if we can pull back for a second, free speech starts from the very simple premise. I may be wrong. I am fallible in my opinion. You were just referring to what happened, and what Janice was saying as ‘drivel.’ I don’t think that I’m in a position or I can decide for everyone’s sake what’s drivel and what’s to be heard. And, when we have opponents who set themselves up as arbiters who block the doors so that other students can’t judge for themselves what’s drivel, and what’s maybe a gem of wisdom, I think there’s a problem there.”

This provoked both Décoste and her compatriot MacLachlan to claim that Fiamengo had put herself in that very role of speech-arbiter when she criticized feminism:

“Janice [Fiamengo],” Décoste said, “first talked about how it was ‘radicals’ who were against her. So she’s characterized people who were against her as radicals when they’re just citizens with opinions that are offended by what she’s saying, and the characterization of radicals is already starting in that direction that she started, actually.”

“I might add,” MacLachlan echoed, “that many of Professor Fiamengo’s talks start by her characterizing a whole swath of her colleagues as ‘intellectually empty, incoherent, and dishonest.’ This is exactly the sort of conversation move that’s designed to provoke a fierce, angry, or laughing response.”

A major problem with this “She started it” defense is that it’s a false parallel. Fiamengo did not load her criticism with the additional weight of telling those with whom she disagreed that they had no right to speak. Unlike Décoste, she did not tell her opposing “citizens” that they should not be allowed an audience.

“My challenge to you all tonight,” Fiamengo said, at the conclusion of her talk at the University of Toronto, “is to be true scholars, real thinkers, genuine intellectuals. For those of you who are doing feminist work, let it be genuine feminist work. Be open to evidence that might take you in surprising directions. Research your subject fully. Do not mistake self-righteousness for scholarly passion. It’s an intoxicating emotion, but it is ultimately hollow and unreliable. And avoid the temptation of blaming the usual suspects. For those men and women of good will here tonight who are uneasy with things you hear in university classrooms, educate yourselves so that you can challenge the myths of academic feminism. And do it with style, not with nastiness, not with slander, not with personal attacks, especially not with hatred.”

While Fiamengo does express the view that modern academic feminists have lacked scholarship in their work, she does not argue that they should be silenced; instead she suggests that both wings of the discussion feed their arguments with facts, and engage in respectful debate. In no way does she live down to Décoste and MacLachlan’s accusation of hypocrisy: she does not, that is, advocate reaching for the nearest fire alarm when one is bothered by feminist arguments. Nor does she suggest that her harsh diagnosis is justification for universities to cancel feminist presentations on campus.

Nevertheless, MacLachlan expanded upon the “you started it” defense by arguing that being yelled at by protestors was a natural consequence of insulting them in the first place.

“If you set out to say things designed to offend and harm people,” she explained, “you can’t complain that your free speech is being violated when people respond with offense, anger, and protest… [free speech] doesn’t mean you’re guaranteed a platform to speak.”

Once again, this is a mischaracterization of Fiamengo’s argument: she is not saying that protestors don’t have the right to argue or protest (although I suspect she would criticize some of their methods as anti-intellectual); the only behaviours that she refers to as infringements of free speech are those that physically bar others from being heard. It is only that kind of physically imposed dogma that she and Trottier argue crosses a crucial protective line that a free society must have.

MacLachlan, though, is not dissuaded by this distinction; instead, she delicately transitions from the (probably true) premise that Fiamengo offended some students, to subtly advocate for university censorship.

“[Free speech] doesn’t mean you get to speak all the time,” she said. “It doesn’t mean that public universities necessarily have to make a place for you or that, if students at those universities want to protest you being given a platform to expound ideas they find harmful, offensive, insulting to their experiences, that they don’t have the right to object to that, by whatever means they have.”

It is only MacLachlan and Décoste who actually suggest or imply in this debate that university censorship may have a legitimate place in such disputes. Never does Fiamengo or Trottier argue for censoring dissent.

“I would certainly never complain,” Fiamengo said (in response to MacLachlan’s argument above), “that my free speech was violated because people responded with anger or laughter. My point about the Queen’s speech [where students called out and sarcastically laughed during the presentation, but no fire alarms were pulled] was that that was an ideal example of freedom of expression and of lively debate… [But] To say that objection and absolutely shutting someone down who has been invited by a university group, who has rented the space that that university group’s dues go to pay for, and has been invited to speak to a group of students, some of whom want to hear what the speaker has to say, to say that it’s okay to shut that down, that that doesn’t somehow count as a suppression of free speech, seems to me absolutely non-sensical.”

Nevertheless, MacLachlan’s strange reversal—of claiming for one’s own side the injury of censorship when one is criticized for having advocated censorship—is an interesting phenomenon (which is not localized to this debate: see the Intelligence Squared debate regarding whether “Free speech must include the license to offend”).

Whether it is sincere or not, the “You censor me when you criticize me” defense demonstrates that even the censorship-apologists (to borrow from a vicious phrase) want to protect some controversial speech. This overlap between both sides ought to have brought us back to Trottier’s vital question: when censorship is contemplated, who, indeed, should be the deciders as to which controversial presentations are unfit for public contemplation?

As the late journalist and intellectual Christopher Hitchens argued in the above-referenced Intelligence Squared debate:

“Who is going to decide?… Who will you appoint? Who will be the one who says, ‘I know exactly where the limit [on free speech] should be. I know how far you can go. And I know when you’ve gone too far. And I’ll decide that’? Who do you think, who do you know, who have you heard of, who have you read about in history who you would give that job?”

It may be the most challenging question that the true believer in the limiting of free expression must contemplate. Even righteous free speech will sometimes offend, so what moral framework can be utilized to make a distinction between what is offensive and worthy of consideration, and what is offensive and unworthy?

Unfortunately, due to the red-herring claim that the protestors were being censored, too, MacLachlan and Décoste were spared taking on this daunting question.


If you would like to examine my examination of this debate for fairness of quoting, I have included a transcript of their conversation as the first comment on this post.


FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH (you were just here)

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM II: Freedom From Criticism

SethBlogs is suspicious of any ideology that attempts to erase criticism and counterargument.

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM (you are here)

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH 


In Episode I of this series, I described various feminist resistance movements which protested critics of women’s studies in ways that many fans of free speech have found morally objectionable. In Episode II below, I intend to give a possible explanation for what may have caused women’s studies to lose its moral and intellectual way.


Justin Trottier, National Policy Director at the Centre for Inquiry, describes the situation as a re-invention of censorship ideals once pointed in the opposite political direction.

“If we go back to the 50s and 60s,” he says, “there was a time when it was the left, and their protests against perhaps the Vietnam war, their protests in favour of civil liberty legislations, ending desegregated schooling, that sort of thing, that was the contentious idea that was subject to censorship. But these days it is criticism of feminism, or radical feminism, it is men’s issues, it is abortion debates. My organization has been involved in debating abortion on campus. We take the pro-choice side. But very often these debates get shut down by well meaning, but unfortunately not well applying student unions that use the wrong methods to defend their morals, which they see to be superior to the rest of us.”

Where do such delusions of infallibility come from?

For a possible explanation, consider Dr. Janice Fiamengo’s March 27, 2014 talk at Queen’s University regarding what she called, “Feminism’s Double Standards,” in which she cogently articulated

(A) examples of the ways that she says men are currently gender-discriminated against in Canadian society, as well as discussing

(B) the complementary rigor-free, patriarchy-focussed work that she claims is done in gender studies classes.

If you watch the video of this talk, note the reaction from the feminists in the crowd who groaned, shouted out disagreements, and sarcastically laughed while Dr. Fiamengo presented her case. They had every right to not be convinced, and to question Fiamengo, but their vocal disdain throughout her presentation articulated to me that they weren’t willing—as they should have been taught in university—to consider her argument.

True intellectual inquiry involves pondering exactly what one’s natural philosophical enemy is saying, imagining what would constitute evidence for their claims, and then considering whether they might have provided a modicum of persuasive currency. Instead, the laughing students already knew that Fiamengo was wrong before she said a word.

When it came time for Q&A, a woman calling herself a philosophy professor stood up to counter Fiamengo.

“I have been [at Queen’s University] for twenty years, I am a feminist…,” pause for applause, “…and a mother of three young men, and so I am very concerned about men in our society. I am a teacher of many young men in this group, and I don’t know what the hell you’re talking about!”

Her side of the room cheered as though Fiamengo had been vanquished by a brilliant logical proof. In lieu of taking on any one of the professor’s fine-tuned examples, and/or pointing to possible errors in Fiamengo’s reasoning, apparently the simple claim, ‘But you’re wrong!’ counted for intellectual discourse from the supposedly feminist side of the academic ledger.

Of course an individual feminist commentator’s emptiness of argument is not a smoking gun either (she may be one anomalous anti-intellectual, which I’m sure even the most intellectually correct movements possess), but the steel-door-closed-minded celebration of her content-free rhetoric from the audience is, I submit, a symptom of the anti-intellectualism within feminist discourse to which Fiamengo refers.

I don’t think that such anti-intellectualism is intrinsic to a fight for women’s equality; instead, I believe it is the inevitable result of a club that has been free from academic scrutiny for a long time.

Philosopher Dr. Christina Hoff Sommers asks rhetorically Who Stole Feminism? as she describes in her 1994 book (and her work as the “Factual Feminist” since) an academic feminist culture that, she says, has been dominated by statistical untruths and “advocacy data.”

“Unfortunately,” she says, “[inaccurate and unsubstantiated statistics] are typical of the quality of information we are getting on many women’s issues from feminist researchers, women’s advocates, and journalists. More often than not, a closer look at the supporting evidence—the studies and statistics on eating disorders, domestic battery, rape, sexual harassment, bias against girls in school, wage differentials, or the demise of the nuclear family—will raise grave questions about credibility, not to speak of objectivity.” (Who Stole Feminism, Page 15.)

As I suggest in THE USEFUL CRUELTY OF SCRUTINY, my belief is that, if Sommers is right that feminism has been stolen (even partly) from an original equality-persuing feminist movement, the primary ally to the robbers has been our society’s unwillingness to demand a security guard, in the forms of academic and media criticism, which would have protected the movement from its own worst ideas. I submit that feminism has achieved this criticism-free existence by two means:

(1) Academic feminism has divorced itself from the standard expectations of intellectual discourse that all ideas—even the best, most intuitively righteous ones—must be scrutinized; instead, it has lived in an insular world of yes-people, who concur with its ideology—no matter where it takes them—or perish. This provokes wild, evidence-free ideas to become doctrine.

According to Dr. Fiamengo (a self-described former “feminist radical,” herself):

“Modern day academic feminism, as it is currently practiced and disseminated in our universities, is overwhelmingly intellectually empty, incoherent, and dishonest.”

(Again, this is not a flaw that is necessarily intrinsic or unique to feminist inquiry, but one which I think would likely apply to any ideology spared the burden of serious critique.)

(2) Popular feminists—trained by the academic clique above—have utilized a false dichotomy in public discussion wherein criticism of feminist philosophy and “facts” equals misogyny. This, I suspect, has served to scare some would-be critics into either softening their criticisms or not speaking at all. More importantly, the terrified media has generally puddled to the will of feminist ideology (and the threat of the scarlet misogyny label); instead of taking the position of neutrality that journalists would at least aim for in regard to other philosophies, they refer to clearly ideological feminists as “experts” and their often questionable statistics as “facts.”

(See my posts THE EMPEROR HAS NO QUESTIONS (ON SEXISM) and ATTACKING MEN for examples of the otherwise critical media turning to mush when speaking to a feminist.)

I do not have the widespread sociological expertise to prove my “when the critical cats are away, the ideological mice will play” assessments of academic feminism; my intention here is only to suggest that

(A) such ideological blindness is more likely to happen in a movement that has reduced critical protections, and

(B) that it’s possible that modern feminism might be existing in such a state of general freedom from serious criticism.

Even those who tend to be persuaded by feminist arguments surely can contemplate the possibility that feminists have gotten a soft ride in academia and the mainstream media in the last couple of decades. And, if it’s conceivable (however unlikely) that feminism is blessed/cursed with fewer opportunities than most disciplines for genuine critique, then, just to be safe, should we not promote—or at least allow—sober intellectual critics to join the discussion?


See Episode I for evidence that such open criticism is currently being shouted down in Canadian universities. Or, for more details of how such anti-intellectualism is defended, see Episode III.


FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM (you were just here)

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH 

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM I: Freedom From Speech

SethBlogs is suspicious of any ideology that attempts to erase criticism and counterargument.

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH (you are here)

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH


Recently there has been some resistance on university campuses to academic and mainstream feminist discourse; critics of feminism argue that gender and women’s studies are often anti-intellectual, statistically inaccurate (sometimes statistically abusive), and misandrist, yet possessing of great powers of influence. Whether your current philosophical and sociological positions would have you agreeing with these critics of modern feminism, the vocal feminist response to them should give you reason to wonder.

In the past three years, men’s and equal rights groups at Canadian schools such as The University of Toronto, The University of Ottawa, Ryerson, and Queen’s have attempted to present a variety of radical speakers who question feminist orthodoxy. In response, some vocal feminists on these campuses reacted not just with counter arguments, but also with attempts to silence the skeptics from asserting their “hateful” ideas. The so-called feminist advocates have promoted this censorship by three means.

(1) They call on their institutions to block the formation of dissenting groups and discussions:

For examples, the Canadian Federation of Students, the University of Toronto Student Union, and The Ryerson Student Union have have all tried to stop men’s awareness and equal rights student groups from forming. In particular, in 2013, the RSU refused to ratify the Ryerson Equality Association because:

(A) They reject “The concept of misandry because it ignores structural inequality that exist between men and women.”

In other words, the RSU is telling a group that its claims of injustice are wrong by definition of the sex of the alleged victims. Indeed, the RSU argument, in its attempt to prove that a phenomenon does not exist, inadvertently does the opposite by exemplifying the very notion it sought to deny.

Moreover, while criticism of feminism may in fact be baseless today, it is dangerous to assume that those at the helm of women’s studies will always be unassailable. If we don’t allow feminist leaders to be openly criticized, how will we know in the future if such criticism does come to be needed? Indeed, if only feminists are allowed to lead the conversation, they have a self-interested reason (the preservation of the institutions that have made them successful) to always allege that men are running the show.

(B) They reject: “Groups, meetings, events or initiatives [that] negate the need to centre women’s voices in the struggle for gender equality.”

Why should a club be obligated to deliberately focus on any particular group’s perspective in their conversation? I don’t object to outlawing discrimination in terms of membership, but if students at a university want to discuss a topic, it sounds rather discriminatory and conversation-controlling to demand that a particular subset of the thinkers leads the discussion.

Perhaps I’m misunderstanding what the RSU means by “center[ing] women’s voices.” Given the group they refused to ratify was actually led by two female students and one male student, the RSU may have meant that they wanted women’s voices centered in a metaphorical sense; perhaps, that is, their intention was that any discussion of sex and gender must be directed by a female-voice-centered framework, such as feminism. But that sounds even more dangerous to free thought. Do we really want to require student groups to focus on the orthodox ideology of their time?

(Excuse the cheap shot, but I imagine that, if Galileo had attempted to start an astronomy club at his university: he would similarly have been refused on the basis that he failed to centre the earth in his discussion.)

According to many feminists, the answer to the above question is Yes, we should expect students groups to adhere to feminist philosophy because feminists, after all, are representing the rights of women (i.e. if you are skeptical of any of their claims, you are, by definition, anti-women). Once again, even if women’s studies professors are right that they are right in all cases, how can we be so sure of their infallibility if we don’t allow them to be subject to review? If they are as omniscient as they say, surely their arguments are strong enough that they can defend themselves against criticism. And, if they’re only mostly right, then would they not benefit from some criticisms so as to chisel their arguments down to their best (as happens in other disciplines)?

On the contrary, these anti-discussion policies were supported by feminist protestors who chanted (to a rather catchy tune, I must admit), “Shame on U of T for allowing Misogyny” in opposition to a talk given by Drs. Katherine Young and Paul Nathanson regarding their unusual takes on misogyny and misandry. So the protestors weren’t just criticizing the two McGill academics (using outlandish, mischaracterizing language to do so), they were also advocating that Young and Nathanson not be allowed to speak at their university where apparently academic feminism has landed on the truth, and so really has no need to be critiqued—thanks anyway.

(It should be noted that not all feminists necessarily agree with such totalitarian tactics and arguments, but nevertheless, I don’t see any academic feminists criticizing them in the public square.)

(2) They physically block free speech:

Along with opposing the formation of anti-misandry groups, some feminists have physically attempted to stop university groups from presenting controversial speakers by

(A) blocking entrances (see former National Organization of Women insider turned anti-misandry leader Dr. Warren Farrell’s attempted talk at the University of Toronto in 2012), and

(B) pulling fire alarms (see feminist critic and English Professor Dr. Janice Fiamengo’s talk at the University of Ottawa in 2013, and Drs. Young and Nathanson’s talk at the University of Toronto in 2013).

I wish this were a straw opponent I’ve set myself up to argue against; surely, every intelligent commentator agrees that literally blocking people from discussing a topic is a contravention of free speech. Not necessarily. Consider a debate on The Agenda with Steve Paikin with Dr. Fiamengo and Justin Trottier (National Policy Director at the Centre for Inquiry) arguing on the one side that free speech must be unfettered, while their opponents, Dr. Alice MacLachlan (Professor of Philosophy at York University) and Rachel Décoste (identified as “community organizer, motivational speaker, and Huffington Post blogger”) countered that these protests were an example of such freedom.

Said Décoste :

“I don’t agree with the fire alarms pulled, but when somebody says that the statistics that we’ve been based on forever are wrong, and therefore rape is not as much of an issue as it should be, I think that draws laughter, if not crying, because it’s just so preposterous. So, if [Dr. Fiamengo] wants to speak, that’s fine, but she doesn’t get to have the forum of our publicly funded universities, paid for by my and your taxes to disseminate that information that’s just not right.”

So, while Décoste officially doesn’t agree with using fire alarms to shut down the professor, she doesn’t condemn the behaviour; instead, she defends the censorship ideals that seem to have provoked it.

Meanwhile, her ally in the discussion, Dr. Alice MacLachlan, argued that, while “No mainstream feminist, including [herself] are ever going to defend the pulling of the fire alarm…,” the protests, themselves, “warmed her.”

“I think it’s important,” she argues, “to talk about what we mean by free speech. I care a lot about free speech. I teach John Stuart Mill. I’m committed to philosophy. We started because Socrates was silenced. Free speech means freedom from government interference and sanction. It doesn’t mean freedom from consequences. And these consequences can include vigorous reactions, criticisms, protests. Unfortunately, it can even mean that the debate doesn’t happen…”

Free speech versus Freedom from consequences is, of course, a noble distinction. Yes, those who utter terrible and/or controversial ideas should be free to say whatever they like, but they cannot expect the rest of us not to criticize them for it. But this protest went beyond the consequence of criticism: it was an attempt to physically stop the talk before it happened and while it was in progress.

(Note: while the fire alarm may have been pulled by one criminal, the resulting exit bell was cheered by the gathering of protestors.)

Dr. MacLachlan is free to have her spirits buoyed by the protestors, but instead of saying she won’t defend the pulling of fire alarms (we don’t know her opinion of blocking entrances), why doesn’t she call out those who supported these actions as traitors to free speech? Instead, McLachlan abdicates her duty to philosophical rigor by helping herself to the most beneficent symbolic interpretation of the protestors without incorporating into her analysis their clear breach with freedom of speech. She says to Dr. Fiamengo that some vigorous protests can lead to a debate not happening. That may be, but what is the professor’s position on the moral legitimacy of the means by which these talks were stopped and/or delayed? It wasn’t the noble protesting that disrupted the talks; it was actions such as fire-alarm-pulling and entrance-blocking. If Dr. McLachlan approves the end effects of these protests, is she not obligated to either admit that she is also in favour of the means, or that she thinks these protestors were well-meaning, but ethically disabled in the way in which they achieved their results?

(I’ll spend more time on the above debate in an upcoming spin-off post, FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH.)

(3) They bully those who disagree with them (or those who want to learn about those who disagree with them):

Setting aside what I wish were just a straw-human argument (the problematic claim that physically stopping free expression should be considered free expression, too), there is, I think, something anti-intellectual contained within protesting university talks aimed at presenting ideas. I am of course not suggesting that the resisters don’t have a right to protest, but I am criticizing them for being anti-intellectual in doing so. There is, as Dr. MacLachlan argued, a vital history of civil protests against governments even if the slogans within such resistance movements are necessarily simple and free of nuance. Such anti-government protests may be crucial to our democracy because they resist those in power; they tell our leaders (and fellow citizens) that some or many of their people are dissatisfied with government policy.

In the case of resisting ideas, however, I am not convinced that protestors can help themselves to the same ethical justification for their loud actions. Individual, non-government thinkers may have influence, but they are not in power, so I don’t think such a blunt instrument as shouting simple slogans at one’s opposite thinkers is a necessary or appropriate tool of resistance on a university campus.

I repeat: protestors have (and should have) the right to criticize any group they choose, but I’m troubled that a philosophy professor, such as Dr. MacLachlan, is unwilling to question their intellectual righteousness. Capital C censorship involves blocking people from speaking (check!), but small C censorship includes bullying and intimidating those who hold contrary views to the established orthodoxy. If, in Dr. MacLachlan’s philosophy class, some students shouted down others for expressing their ideas, I hope (and suspect) she would she tell the intellectual gathering that, in a philosophy class, there is an expectation of respectful discourse such that everyone is allowed to freely express themselves. Universities, I understand, are intended to be places where all ideas are given opportunities to be heard (and criticized); isn’t that why we think it’s so important to give professors life-time tenure, so they’ll never be afraid to speak out when they disagree with popular thought? So why is Dr. MacLachlan so unwilling to say that, while the student protestors had every right to yell at the feminist critics, they were in fact anti-intellectual for doing so?

To my thinking, the primary reason campus feminists are so loud in their resistance to criticism of academic feminism is because—like toddlers being told No for the first time—they are not used to it.


I will make my case for this “terrible twos” hypothesis in Episode II of this series.


FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH (you were just here)

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LAZY JOURNALISM V: The Emperor Has No Questions (On Sexism)

Journalism is vital to a free society; so, too, is criticism of the media. And yet SethBlogs doesn’t see as much oversight of the media’s methods as there is for other vital societal resources. SethBlogs suspects that this oversight oversight provokes a lazy complacency among our favourite journalistic representatives.

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LAZY JOURNALISM SERIES:

I: THE USEFUL CRUELTY OF SCRUTINY (OF IDEAS)

II: EXTRA SENSORY PRESUMPTIONS (OF EMOTION)

III: SMYTH vs. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY (OF ROLES)

IV: EXTRA SENSORY PRESUMPTIONS (OF INTENTION)

V: THE EMPEROR HAS NO QUESTIONS (ON SEXISM) (you are here)

VI: THE EMPEROR HAS NO QUESTIONS (ON RACISM)


Recently, CBC Radio’s BC-based public affairs radio broadcast, On the Coast, has interviewed two UBC graduate students, discussing issues of gender and race. In general CBC Radio prefers not to ask critical questions of their guests, but when the visitor is saying something recognized as progressive about gender or race, the fawning faith in their testimony is turned up to eleven.

In today’s episode, an intelligent but deferential CBC interviewer speaks to a sociologist who argues that male-“dominated” workplaces may be more likely to nourish higher levels of counterproductive risk than gender-balanced work sites. This is fascinating research, but it might benefit from some serious ethical meta questions. 


Men-in-groups-take-extra-risks-so-perhaps-we-should-have-more-women-in-such-occupations PhD student, Hazel Hollingdale, seemed—in my hearing during her interview with CBC’s Matthew Lazin-Ryder—to be a legitimate investigator; that is, she seemed interested in daunting things like evidence.

She explained that in professions in which there are normally more men than women, there seem to be more instances of bodily injury (in the case of blue-collar occupations) and strategic failures (in the case of white-collar workplaces), both of which she attributes to detrimentally high-risk behaviour:

“I started getting interested in male-dominated work organizations during my Masters when I actually looked at blue-collar sectors, so construction, and iron workers, that sort of thing, and I looked at safety violations, and occupational health and safety outcomes, and realizing that that sort of male-dominated culture often resulted in a normalization of risk there, which resulted in occupational health and safety incidents. And then I started thinking, well, what does risk-taking look like in other male-dominated occupations, stock brokers, for instance [where] an estimated 90% of their workforce is men, and irresponsible risks there [don’t] come from bodily harm, but what happens is that there are undesirable outcomes potentially, like losing a lot of money, or even a financial crash if enough people are engaging in those irresponsible risks…”

Hollingdale goes on to discuss the potentially positive effects of larger numbers of women being in traditionally male white-collar roles:

“There’s research actually from UBC, the Sauder School of business, that’s recently shown that more women on board of directors actually increases the investment potential and that sort of thing, but the Lehman Sisters hypothesis, which is what I’m testing, this idea of more women in financial firms leading to greater, more stable economic markets, hasn’t been formally tested in a large scale, so there are no numbers yet, which is why I hope to find support for it in my own research.”

Although she didn’t mention it in the discussion (possibly because she wasn’t asked), let’s assume that her study fairly took into account factors outside of sex (including occupational personality traits) that could be causing the apparent sex discrepancies that she’s finding. These considerations, however, should not eliminate possible controversy. On a meta level, a study that differentiates between the sexes and their ability to create cohesive and effective workplaces ought to be scrutinized not just for scientific validity, but also for its assumed ethical implications.

It does seem like the province of sociologists to investigate the sub-cultural forces within societies and their effects on the workplace, even if that research includes a sex-based aptitude comparison; however, when claiming that a particular sex has superior talents than another, one should recognize that one is playing with ethically delicate issues. If we prove that male people tend not to do well in groups, then—rather inconveniently to activist sociologists—the question remains as to whether there is something we should do about it? Should we discriminate against individual men because groups of men sometimes don’t work well together?

As I’ve argued in DOUBLE STANDARD OF DOUBLE STANDARDS, if it is the case that—on average—women have more success than men in a particular situation, then the only legitimate way to handle such a discrepancy would be to seek out candidates (of either sex, indiscriminately) who possess the traits that are provoking those improved results. Thus, if the research is right, we’ll naturally end up with a more effective workplace (which might turn out to include more women than men), while not excluding the occasional men who also possess the useful skill in question, or over-including the women who do not.

However, the matter may not be as simple in the case posited by the researcher here, because her results may not demonstrate that women are superior to men in the traits she argues are good, but instead that—when men make up a vast majority in a profession—there is a tendency to behave ineffectively or unsafely. Therefore, it may be the case that—even if all the men in the male-“dominated” profession have a high level of aptitude for the work—the sum of the skills of such a homogenous (male) group may be inferior to a mixed-sex environment.

Nevertheless, questions ought still to be asked: if a certain percentage of gender or racial balance is shown to be less optimal than another, do we gender or racially profile to acquire the best result? That is, do those efficiency ends justify such discriminatory means? (These are the sort of questions that a CBC interviewer ought to—but never would—ask of a sociologist.)

Moreover, have we considered alternative options to sex-based discrimination? Maybe instead we could find new measures of reducing the sort of negative risk (possibly provoked by mostly-male environments) that the researcher says are bad for business; for instance, perhaps there is a particular personality type (which happens to be more common among men than women) that the employers could screen for. As a result, we may end up with more women in the job, but not by direct virtue of their sex, but instead on the basis of a demonstrated skill or personality type.

Meanwhile, does the argued-for discrimination—based upon homogenous flaws—apply to groups that society currently wants to protect? Presumably, that is, if it’s the case that male-“dominated” professions have weaknesses that a more mixed group would not, then surely it’s possible that female-“dominated” professions might also do better with a greater mix. (But I suspect that studies of this nature are less likely to receive funding in UBC’s sociology department, and certainly wouldn’t be cheered on by CBC.)

Ultimately, sociologists may be willing to accept (even if they won’t study) the possibility that certain higher-percentage-female professions could benefit from a slightly greater percentage of men, but what would happen if they were to find results that are even more counter to current politically correct thinking? What if it turned out that a particular male-“dominated” profession would do better with fewer women? I’m not suggesting that it’s likely, but it’s possible, so before approving the implications of these men-are-a-problem studies for influence on society, shouldn’t we ask ourselves whether optimal racial and gender divides are more important than freedom from gender and racial profiling in the workplace?

I’m not opposed to sociologists looking into these matters (as long as they do it scientifically) so that we can try to figure out what—in a perfect world—would be the most cohesive and efficient workplace environment, but before we force that result independent of human rights, I submit that we ought to look for a means of striving for said efficiency that doesn’t directly discriminate on the basis of sex.

This is daunting ethical terrain that demands serious consideration, but the CBC’s ordinarily skilled interviewer Matthew Lazin-Ryder—apparently terrified of asking politically inappropriate questions—could only muster the following impersonation of a critical question about Hollingdale’s hopes for her work to provoke pro-female hiring policies:

“Gender issues can often get political, and stir up angry debate, and I could see, imagine this: if you prove your hypothesis that, it’ll be kind of big headlines all over the place. ‘More women on boards and in executive roles decreases the risk or irresponsible risk taking’ and then we’ll have all kinds of reaction of a political kind, saying that, well, this is politically correct: you’re just trying to get more equality, and all of that issue. Are you prepared for that kind of reaction?”

The question was so soft that it almost fell to the ground before it reached Hollingdale, who predictably went with an If equality is wrong, I don’t want to be right type response.

“Well,” she said, “honestly, I’m hoping to get more support for this hypothesis because when 3-5% of top positions are held by women, there is clearly a problem. And I don’t think equality within these organizations is a bad goal to work towards. So, yeah, I think definitely people get upset by these sorts of things, but it’s just a reality that there’s so much inequality and it needs to find support in order to garner motivations for firms to actually hire women into these positions.”

I don’t necessarily blame the interviewee for her simple reply since the question was so empty of content. However, her answer does demonstrate that she may not merely be playing the role of sociologist here, but also ethicist and social engineer, as she appears to be suggesting that her results should have an effect on hiring policies. Or maybe she is simply being candid about her bias, and will leave the ethical contemplations to others; in any case, her hopes for particular results do suggest that she may be analyzing the data with preferential expectations. I don’t think that that’s an unforgivable quality in a social scientist (so long as they’re vigilant about keeping their hopes out of their data analysis), but it should be a concern to a CBC interviewer, who ought to have asked:

“Given that you are hoping for results that will provoke these changes in the world, what do you do to ensure that you don’t let those preferences impact how you interpret your work?”

Alas, no, the interviewer had clearly left his brain in the cloak roam and continued to cheerlead his subject. The result was a discussion of research, which—while possibly legitimate—has serious potential consequences. And yet it was treated as though it were unassailable. I doubt that a study that found problems with a predominantly female workforce would have been treated so gently.


In case you would like to examine my examination of Lazin-Ryder’s interview with Hollingdale, I have included the transcript of their conversation as the first comment on this post.


UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LAZY JOURNALISM SERIES:

I: THE USEFUL CRUELTY OF SCRUTINY (OF IDEAS)

II: EXTRA SENSORY PRESUMPTIONS (OF EMOTION)

III: SMYTH vs. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY (OF ROLES)

IV: EXTRA SENSORY PRESUMPTIONS (OF INTENTION)

V: THE EMPEROR HAS NO QUESTIONS (ON SEXISM) (you were just here)

VI: THE EMPEROR HAS NO QUESTIONS (ON RACISM)