SethBlogs is suspicious of any ideology that attempts to erase criticism and counterargument.

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH (you are here)

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In my recent FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM posts, I describe what I believe have been disruptions to free expression in the last few years by so-called feminists on Canadian universities who not only protested, but also attempted to bar men’s and equal rights groups from presenting speakers who possessed counter-narratives to academic feminism. I referenced a debate on The Agenda with Steve Paikin, with English professor and feminist skeptic, Dr. Janice Fiamengo, and free speech advocate, Justin Trottier (National Policy Director at the Centre for Inquiry), arguing on the one side that the above-described campus feminists were indeed exhibiting actions that infringed on free thought, while their opponents in the discussion, feminist and philosophy professor Dr. Alice MacLachlan, along with feminist, writer, and activist Rachel Décoste, countered that the protests were beautiful examples of the sort of free expression that fuel free thought.

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In this spin-off post, I’d like to examine a pair of contentions made by the MacLachlan-Décoste team, which I found to be logically objectionable.

(1) The “You benefitted from it” argument:

In trying to prove that the suppressing treatment that Fiamengo received on university campuses was, in fact, an example of free speech, MacLachlan points out that Fiamengo’s ideas may have received greater exposure as a result.

“I was only recently made familiar with Janice’s [Fiamengo’s] experiences,” MacLachlan said. “I had the chance to watch them on youtube. And what I saw warmed me. I saw people who cared very much about gender issues, some identifying as feminists, some identifying as men’s rights activists, vigorously, wholeheartedly, and determinedly engaging with each other. Yelling, not always being polite. And as a result, I know that Janice’s work has received a much wider audience, including a platform on this show. I think this is the very opposite of silencing and it’s how a society of free speech works.”

Later, Fiamengo asked MacLachlan “how [she] would feel if [she] were giving a talk and [she was] shut down by a group of protesters? Would [she] say, ‘This was a wonderful example of freedom of speech,’ if [she] never got to say [her] first sentence?”

This provoked MacLachlan to reiterate her argument that the protests had ultimately served Fiamengo well.

“I would certainly not frame it in terms of freedom of speech,” she said. “How I would feel is I would feel shocked. If that led to a much wider platform for my views, including an entire episode of The Agenda being dedicated to them, I’d probably be pretty pleased about the whole thing, and I suspect that’s the case for [Fiamengo] as well.”

This is a dangerous game of unintended consequences justifying troubling means. It may be the case that Fiamengo’s career has, in the long run, been enhanced by the discussion provoked by the troubling actions of these protestors; it’s also possible that Fiamengo’s reputation has been injured by the shameful and baseless accusations that she is a misogynist and a rape apologist. I have no idea whether, on the balance, Fiamengo has benefitted or not from these protests, but for the purpose of this discussion, I will stipulate that she has done well by them. However, such a result does not retroactively justify crimes and attempts to censor Fiamengo and other speakers.

The question in this debate is whether particular actions of the protestors were legitimate or not. The notion that some of their alleged victims inadvertently benefitted from their alleged crimes should have no weight whatsoever upon our assessment. Similarly, someone who is the victim of an assault may consequently receive positive public attention that offers them career opportunities that they might not have otherwise had. However, I hope that we all agree that such unintended proceeds do not justify the assault. I see no difference here.

(2) The “You started it” argument:

This one requires some context. In her defense of the notion of quelling Fiamengo’s public presence in universities, Décoste argued that Canadian civil rights do not promise her a platform.

“The charter of rights and freedoms guarantees freedom of expression,” she explained. “It doesn’t guarantee you the right to dispel your drivel, really just untruths, to impressionable minds with a mic, and amplifier, and an audience of impressionable students.”

Thus, she concluded that, while she technically disagreed with pulling fire alarms, it was not appropriate for Dr. Fiamengo to spread her counter-to-feminist-gospel ideas at a university of all places.

“I don’t agree with the fire alarms pulled,” she said, “but when somebody says that the statistics that we’ve been based on forever are wrong, and therefore rape is not as much of an issue as it should be, I think that draws laughter, if not crying, because it’s just so preposterous. So, if she wants to speak, that’s fine, but she doesn’t get to have the forum of our publicly funded universities, paid for by my and your taxes, to disseminate that information that’s just not right.”

Apparently, while Décoste may not agree with something as dangerous as fire alarm pulling, she does ask the state to pull a metaphorical alarm before such a scandalous talk.

Décoste’s philosophical opponent, Trottier, argued in reply that drivel-banning would be a tricky, because, strangely, not everyone would have the same definition of unworthy speech.

“These are public universities,” he said. “We all pay through tuition subsidies, that kind of thing, from the government. Many of us are students at these universities, and have differences of opinion. We all pay tuition to attend them. The thing, though, is if we can pull back for a second, free speech starts from the very simple premise. I may be wrong. I am fallible in my opinion. You were just referring to what happened, and what Janice was saying as ‘drivel.’ I don’t think that I’m in a position or I can decide for everyone’s sake what’s drivel and what’s to be heard. And, when we have opponents who set themselves up as arbiters who block the doors so that other students can’t judge for themselves what’s drivel, and what’s maybe a gem of wisdom, I think there’s a problem there.”

This provoked both Décoste and her compatriot MacLachlan to claim that Fiamengo had put herself in that very role of speech-arbiter when she criticized feminism:

“Janice [Fiamengo],” Décoste said, “first talked about how it was ‘radicals’ who were against her. So she’s characterized people who were against her as radicals when they’re just citizens with opinions that are offended by what she’s saying, and the characterization of radicals is already starting in that direction that she started, actually.”

“I might add,” MacLachlan echoed, “that many of Professor Fiamengo’s talks start by her characterizing a whole swath of her colleagues as ‘intellectually empty, incoherent, and dishonest.’ This is exactly the sort of conversation move that’s designed to provoke a fierce, angry, or laughing response.”

A major problem with this “She started it” defense is that it’s a false parallel. Fiamengo did not load her criticism with the additional weight of telling those with whom she disagreed that they had no right to speak. Unlike Décoste, she did not tell her opposing “citizens” that they should not be allowed an audience.

“My challenge to you all tonight,” Fiamengo said, at the conclusion of her talk at the University of Toronto, “is to be true scholars, real thinkers, genuine intellectuals. For those of you who are doing feminist work, let it be genuine feminist work. Be open to evidence that might take you in surprising directions. Research your subject fully. Do not mistake self-righteousness for scholarly passion. It’s an intoxicating emotion, but it is ultimately hollow and unreliable. And avoid the temptation of blaming the usual suspects. For those men and women of good will here tonight who are uneasy with things you hear in university classrooms, educate yourselves so that you can challenge the myths of academic feminism. And do it with style, not with nastiness, not with slander, not with personal attacks, especially not with hatred.”

While Fiamengo does express the view that modern academic feminists have lacked scholarship in their work, she does not argue that they should be silenced; instead she suggests that both wings of the discussion feed their arguments with facts, and engage in respectful debate. In no way does she live down to Décoste and MacLachlan’s accusation of hypocrisy: she does not, that is, advocate reaching for the nearest fire alarm when one is bothered by feminist arguments. Nor does she suggest that her harsh diagnosis is justification for universities to cancel feminist presentations on campus.

Nevertheless, MacLachlan expanded upon the “you started it” defense by arguing that being yelled at by protestors was a natural consequence of insulting them in the first place.

“If you set out to say things designed to offend and harm people,” she explained, “you can’t complain that your free speech is being violated when people respond with offense, anger, and protest… [free speech] doesn’t mean you’re guaranteed a platform to speak.”

Once again, this is a mischaracterization of Fiamengo’s argument: she is not saying that protestors don’t have the right to argue or protest (although I suspect she would criticize some of their methods as anti-intellectual); the only behaviours that she refers to as infringements of free speech are those that physically bar others from being heard. It is only that kind of physically imposed dogma that she and Trottier argue crosses a crucial protective line that a free society must have.

MacLachlan, though, is not dissuaded by this distinction; instead, she delicately transitions from the (probably true) premise that Fiamengo offended some students, to subtly advocate for university censorship.

“[Free speech] doesn’t mean you get to speak all the time,” she said. “It doesn’t mean that public universities necessarily have to make a place for you or that, if students at those universities want to protest you being given a platform to expound ideas they find harmful, offensive, insulting to their experiences, that they don’t have the right to object to that, by whatever means they have.”

It is only MacLachlan and Décoste who actually suggest or imply in this debate that university censorship may have a legitimate place in such disputes. Never does Fiamengo or Trottier argue for censoring dissent.

“I would certainly never complain,” Fiamengo said (in response to MacLachlan’s argument above), “that my free speech was violated because people responded with anger or laughter. My point about the Queen’s speech [where students called out and sarcastically laughed during the presentation, but no fire alarms were pulled] was that that was an ideal example of freedom of expression and of lively debate… [But] To say that objection and absolutely shutting someone down who has been invited by a university group, who has rented the space that that university group’s dues go to pay for, and has been invited to speak to a group of students, some of whom want to hear what the speaker has to say, to say that it’s okay to shut that down, that that doesn’t somehow count as a suppression of free speech, seems to me absolutely non-sensical.”

Nevertheless, MacLachlan’s strange reversal—of claiming for one’s own side the injury of censorship when one is criticized for having advocated censorship—is an interesting phenomenon (which is not localized to this debate: see the Intelligence Squared debate regarding whether “Free speech must include the license to offend”).

Whether it is sincere or not, the “You censor me when you criticize me” defense demonstrates that even the censorship-apologists (to borrow from a vicious phrase) want to protect some controversial speech. This overlap between both sides ought to have brought us back to Trottier’s vital question: when censorship is contemplated, who, indeed, should be the deciders as to which controversial presentations are unfit for public contemplation?

As the late journalist and intellectual Christopher Hitchens argued in the above-referenced Intelligence Squared debate:

“Who is going to decide?… Who will you appoint? Who will be the one who says, ‘I know exactly where the limit [on free speech] should be. I know how far you can go. And I know when you’ve gone too far. And I’ll decide that’? Who do you think, who do you know, who have you heard of, who have you read about in history who you would give that job?”

It may be the most challenging question that the true believer in the limiting of free expression must contemplate. Even righteous free speech will sometimes offend, so what moral framework can be utilized to make a distinction between what is offensive and worthy of consideration, and what is offensive and unworthy?

Unfortunately, due to the red-herring claim that the protestors were being censored, too, MacLachlan and Décoste were spared taking on this daunting question.

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If you would like to examine my examination of this debate for fairness of quoting, I have included a transcript of their conversation as the first comment on this post.

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FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH (you were just here)

SethBlogs is suspicious of any ideology that attempts to erase criticism and counterargument.

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM (you are here)

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH 

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In Episode I of this series, I described various feminist resistance movements which protested critics of women’s studies in ways that many fans of free speech have found morally objectionable. In Episode II below, I intend to give a possible explanation for what may have caused women’s studies to lose its moral and intellectual way.

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Justin Trottier, National Policy Director at the Centre for Inquiry, describes the situation as a re-invention of censorship ideals once pointed in the opposite political direction.

“If we go back to the 50s and 60s,” he says, “there was a time when it was the left, and their protests against perhaps the Vietnam war, their protests in favour of civil liberty legislations, ending desegregated schooling, that sort of thing, that was the contentious idea that was subject to censorship. But these days it is criticism of feminism, or radical feminism, it is men’s issues, it is abortion debates. My organization has been involved in debating abortion on campus. We take the pro-choice side. But very often these debates get shut down by well meaning, but unfortunately not well applying student unions that use the wrong methods to defend their morals, which they see to be superior to the rest of us.”

Where do such delusions of infallibility come from?

For a possible explanation, consider Dr. Janice Fiamengo’s March 27, 2014 talk at Queen’s University regarding what she called, “Feminism’s Double Standards,” in which she cogently articulated

(A) examples of the ways that she says men are currently gender-discriminated against in Canadian society, as well as discussing

(B) the complementary rigor-free, patriarchy-focussed work that she claims is done in gender studies classes.

If you watch the video of this talk, note the reaction from the feminists in the crowd who groaned, shouted out disagreements, and sarcastically laughed while Dr. Fiamengo presented her case. They had every right to not be convinced, and to question Fiamengo, but their vocal disdain throughout her presentation articulated to me that they weren’t willing—as they should have been taught in university—to consider her argument.

True intellectual inquiry involves pondering exactly what one’s natural philosophical enemy is saying, imagining what would constitute evidence for their claims, and then considering whether they might have provided a modicum of persuasive currency. Instead, the laughing students already knew that Fiamengo was wrong before she said a word.

When it came time for Q&A, a woman calling herself a philosophy professor stood up to counter Fiamengo.

“I have been [at Queen’s University] for twenty years, I am a feminist…,” pause for applause, “…and a mother of three young men, and so I am very concerned about men in our society. I am a teacher of many young men in this group, and I don’t know what the hell you’re talking about!”

Her side of the room cheered as though Fiamengo had been vanquished by a brilliant logical proof. In lieu of taking on any one of the professor’s fine-tuned examples, and/or pointing to possible errors in Fiamengo’s reasoning, apparently the simple claim, ‘But you’re wrong!’ counted for intellectual discourse from the supposedly feminist side of the academic ledger.

Of course an individual feminist commentator’s emptiness of argument is not a smoking gun either (she may be one anomalous anti-intellectual, which I’m sure even the most intellectually correct movements possess), but the steel-door-closed-minded celebration of her content-free rhetoric from the audience is, I submit, a symptom of the anti-intellectualism within feminist discourse to which Fiamengo refers.

I don’t think that such anti-intellectualism is intrinsic to a fight for women’s equality; instead, I believe it is the inevitable result of a club that has been free from academic scrutiny for a long time.

Philosopher Dr. Christina Hoff Sommers asks rhetorically Who Stole Feminism? as she describes in her 1994 book (and her work as the “Factual Feminist” since) an academic feminist culture that, she says, has been dominated by statistical untruths and “advocacy data.”

“Unfortunately,” she says, “[inaccurate and unsubstantiated statistics] are typical of the quality of information we are getting on many women’s issues from feminist researchers, women’s advocates, and journalists. More often than not, a closer look at the supporting evidence—the studies and statistics on eating disorders, domestic battery, rape, sexual harassment, bias against girls in school, wage differentials, or the demise of the nuclear family—will raise grave questions about credibility, not to speak of objectivity.” (Who Stole Feminism, Page 15.)

As I suggest in THE USEFUL CRUELTY OF SCRUTINY, my belief is that, if Sommers is right that feminism has been stolen (even partly) from an original equality-persuing feminist movement, the primary ally to the robbers has been our society’s unwillingness to demand a security guard, in the forms of academic and media criticism, which would have protected the movement from its own worst ideas. I submit that feminism has achieved this criticism-free existence by two means:

(1) Academic feminism has divorced itself from the standard expectations of intellectual discourse that all ideas—even the best, most intuitively righteous ones—must be scrutinized; instead, it has lived in an insular world of yes-people, who concur with its ideology—no matter where it takes them—or perish. This provokes wild, evidence-free ideas to become doctrine.

According to Dr. Fiamengo (a self-described former “feminist radical,” herself):

“Modern day academic feminism, as it is currently practiced and disseminated in our universities, is overwhelmingly intellectually empty, incoherent, and dishonest.”

(Again, this is not a flaw that is necessarily intrinsic or unique to feminist inquiry, but one which I think would likely apply to any ideology spared the burden of serious critique.)

(2) Popular feminists—trained by the academic clique above—have utilized a false dichotomy in public discussion wherein criticism of feminist philosophy and “facts” equals misogyny. This, I suspect, has served to scare some would-be critics into either softening their criticisms or not speaking at all. More importantly, the terrified media has generally puddled to the will of feminist ideology (and the threat of the scarlet misogyny label); instead of taking the position of neutrality that journalists would at least aim for in regard to other philosophies, they refer to clearly ideological feminists as “experts” and their often questionable statistics as “facts.”

(See my posts THE EMPEROR HAS NO QUESTIONS (ON SEXISM) and ATTACKING MEN for examples of the otherwise critical media turning to mush when speaking to a feminist.)

I do not have the widespread sociological expertise to prove my “when the critical cats are away, the ideological mice will play” assessments of academic feminism; my intention here is only to suggest that

(A) such ideological blindness is more likely to happen in a movement that has reduced critical protections, and

(B) that it’s possible that modern feminism might be existing in such a state of general freedom from serious criticism.

Even those who tend to be persuaded by feminist arguments surely can contemplate the possibility that feminists have gotten a soft ride in academia and the mainstream media in the last couple of decades. And, if it’s conceivable (however unlikely) that feminism is blessed/cursed with fewer opportunities than most disciplines for genuine critique, then, just to be safe, should we not promote—or at least allow—sober intellectual critics to join the discussion?

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See Episode I for evidence that such open criticism is currently being shouted down in Canadian universities. Or, for more details of how such anti-intellectualism is defended, see Episode III.

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FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM (you were just here)

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH 

SethBlogs is suspicious of any ideology that attempts to erase criticism and counterargument.

FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH (you are here)

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH

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Recently there has been some resistance on university campuses to academic and mainstream feminist discourse; critics of feminism argue that gender and women’s studies are often anti-intellectual, statistically inaccurate (sometimes statistically abusive), and misandrist, yet possessing of great powers of influence. Whether your current philosophical and sociological positions would have you agreeing with these critics of modern feminism, the vocal feminist response to them should give you reason to wonder.

In the past three years, men’s and equal rights groups at Canadian schools such as The University of Toronto, The University of Ottawa, Ryerson, and Queen’s have attempted to present a variety of radical speakers who question feminist orthodoxy. In response, some vocal feminists on these campuses reacted not just with counter arguments, but also with attempts to silence the skeptics from asserting their “hateful” ideas. The so-called feminist advocates have promoted this censorship by three means.

(1) They call on their institutions to block the formation of dissenting groups and discussions:

For examples, the Canadian Federation of Students, the University of Toronto Student Union, and The Ryerson Student Union have have all tried to stop men’s awareness and equal rights student groups from forming. In particular, in 2013, the RSU refused to ratify the Ryerson Equality Association because:

(A) They reject “The concept of misandry because it ignores structural inequality that exist between men and women.”

In other words, the RSU is telling a group that its claims of injustice are wrong by definition of the sex of the alleged victims. Indeed, the RSU argument, in its attempt to prove that a phenomenon does not exist, inadvertently does the opposite by exemplifying the very notion it sought to deny.

Moreover, while criticism of feminism may in fact be baseless today, it is dangerous to assume that those at the helm of women’s studies will always be unassailable. If we don’t allow feminist leaders to be openly criticized, how will we know in the future if such criticism does come to be needed? Indeed, if only feminists are allowed to lead the conversation, they have a self-interested reason (the preservation of the institutions that have made them successful) to always allege that men are running the show.

(B) They reject: “Groups, meetings, events or initiatives [that] negate the need to centre women’s voices in the struggle for gender equality.”

Why should a club be obligated to deliberately focus on any particular group’s perspective in their conversation? I don’t object to outlawing discrimination in terms of membership, but if students at a university want to discuss a topic, it sounds rather discriminatory and conversation-controlling to demand that a particular subset of the thinkers leads the discussion.

Perhaps I’m misunderstanding what the RSU means by “center[ing] women’s voices.” Given the group they refused to ratify was actually led by two female students and one male student, the RSU may have meant that they wanted women’s voices centered in a metaphorical sense; perhaps, that is, their intention was that any discussion of sex and gender must be directed by a female-voice-centered framework, such as feminism. But that sounds even more dangerous to free thought. Do we really want to require student groups to focus on the orthodox ideology of their time?

(Excuse the cheap shot, but I imagine that, if Galileo had attempted to start an astronomy club at his university: he would similarly have been refused on the basis that he failed to centre the earth in his discussion.)

According to many feminists, the answer to the above question is Yes, we should expect students groups to adhere to feminist philosophy because feminists, after all, are representing the rights of women (i.e. if you are skeptical of any of their claims, you are, by definition, anti-women). Once again, even if women’s studies professors are right that they are right in all cases, how can we be so sure of their infallibility if we don’t allow them to be subject to review? If they are as omniscient as they say, surely their arguments are strong enough that they can defend themselves against criticism. And, if they’re only mostly right, then would they not benefit from some criticisms so as to chisel their arguments down to their best (as happens in other disciplines)?

On the contrary, these anti-discussion policies were supported by feminist protestors who chanted (to a rather catchy tune, I must admit), “Shame on U of T for allowing Misogyny” in opposition to a talk given by Drs. Katherine Young and Paul Nathanson regarding their unusual takes on misogyny and misandry. So the protestors weren’t just criticizing the two McGill academics (using outlandish, mischaracterizing language to do so), they were also advocating that Young and Nathanson not be allowed to speak at their university where apparently academic feminism has landed on the truth, and so really has no need to be critiqued—thanks anyway.

(It should be noted that not all feminists necessarily agree with such totalitarian tactics and arguments, but nevertheless, I don’t see any academic feminists criticizing them in the public square.)

(2) They physically block free speech:

Along with opposing the formation of anti-misandry groups, some feminists have physically attempted to stop university groups from presenting controversial speakers by

(A) blocking entrances (see former National Organization of Women insider turned anti-misandry leader Dr. Warren Farrell’s attempted talk at the University of Toronto in 2012), and

(B) pulling fire alarms (see feminist critic and English Professor Dr. Janice Fiamengo’s talk at the University of Ottawa in 2013, and Drs. Young and Nathanson’s talk at the University of Toronto in 2013).

I wish this were a straw opponent I’ve set myself up to argue against; surely, every intelligent commentator agrees that literally blocking people from discussing a topic is a contravention of free speech. Not necessarily. Consider a debate on The Agenda with Steve Paikin with Dr. Fiamengo and Justin Trottier (National Policy Director at the Centre for Inquiry) arguing on the one side that free speech must be unfettered, while their opponents, Dr. Alice MacLachlan (Professor of Philosophy at York University) and Rachel Décoste (identified as “community organizer, motivational speaker, and Huffington Post blogger”) countered that these protests were an example of such freedom.

Said Décoste :

“I don’t agree with the fire alarms pulled, but when somebody says that the statistics that we’ve been based on forever are wrong, and therefore rape is not as much of an issue as it should be, I think that draws laughter, if not crying, because it’s just so preposterous. So, if [Dr. Fiamengo] wants to speak, that’s fine, but she doesn’t get to have the forum of our publicly funded universities, paid for by my and your taxes to disseminate that information that’s just not right.”

So, while Décoste officially doesn’t agree with using fire alarms to shut down the professor, she doesn’t condemn the behaviour; instead, she defends the censorship ideals that seem to have provoked it.

Meanwhile, her ally in the discussion, Dr. Alice MacLachlan, argued that, while “No mainstream feminist, including [herself] are ever going to defend the pulling of the fire alarm…,” the protests, themselves, “warmed her.”

“I think it’s important,” she argues, “to talk about what we mean by free speech. I care a lot about free speech. I teach John Stuart Mill. I’m committed to philosophy. We started because Socrates was silenced. Free speech means freedom from government interference and sanction. It doesn’t mean freedom from consequences. And these consequences can include vigorous reactions, criticisms, protests. Unfortunately, it can even mean that the debate doesn’t happen…”

Free speech versus Freedom from consequences is, of course, a noble distinction. Yes, those who utter terrible and/or controversial ideas should be free to say whatever they like, but they cannot expect the rest of us not to criticize them for it. But this protest went beyond the consequence of criticism: it was an attempt to physically stop the talk before it happened and while it was in progress.

(Note: while the fire alarm may have been pulled by one criminal, the resulting exit bell was cheered by the gathering of protestors.)

Dr. MacLachlan is free to have her spirits buoyed by the protestors, but instead of saying she won’t defend the pulling of fire alarms (we don’t know her opinion of blocking entrances), why doesn’t she call out those who supported these actions as traitors to free speech? Instead, McLachlan abdicates her duty to philosophical rigor by helping herself to the most beneficent symbolic interpretation of the protestors without incorporating into her analysis their clear breach with freedom of speech. She says to Dr. Fiamengo that some vigorous protests can lead to a debate not happening. That may be, but what is the professor’s position on the moral legitimacy of the means by which these talks were stopped and/or delayed? It wasn’t the noble protesting that disrupted the talks; it was actions such as fire-alarm-pulling and entrance-blocking. If Dr. McLachlan approves the end effects of these protests, is she not obligated to either admit that she is also in favour of the means, or that she thinks these protestors were well-meaning, but ethically disabled in the way in which they achieved their results?

(I’ll spend more time on the above debate in an upcoming spin-off post, FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH.)

(3) They bully those who disagree with them (or those who want to learn about those who disagree with them):

Setting aside what I wish were just a straw-human argument (the problematic claim that physically stopping free expression should be considered free expression, too), there is, I think, something anti-intellectual contained within protesting university talks aimed at presenting ideas. I am of course not suggesting that the resisters don’t have a right to protest, but I am criticizing them for being anti-intellectual in doing so. There is, as Dr. MacLachlan argued, a vital history of civil protests against governments even if the slogans within such resistance movements are necessarily simple and free of nuance. Such anti-government protests may be crucial to our democracy because they resist those in power; they tell our leaders (and fellow citizens) that some or many of their people are dissatisfied with government policy.

In the case of resisting ideas, however, I am not convinced that protestors can help themselves to the same ethical justification for their loud actions. Individual, non-government thinkers may have influence, but they are not in power, so I don’t think such a blunt instrument as shouting simple slogans at one’s opposite thinkers is a necessary or appropriate tool of resistance on a university campus.

I repeat: protestors have (and should have) the right to criticize any group they choose, but I’m troubled that a philosophy professor, such as Dr. MacLachlan, is unwilling to question their intellectual righteousness. Capital C censorship involves blocking people from speaking (check!), but small C censorship includes bullying and intimidating those who hold contrary views to the established orthodoxy. If, in Dr. MacLachlan’s philosophy class, some students shouted down others for expressing their ideas, I hope (and suspect) she would she tell the intellectual gathering that, in a philosophy class, there is an expectation of respectful discourse such that everyone is allowed to freely express themselves. Universities, I understand, are intended to be places where all ideas are given opportunities to be heard (and criticized); isn’t that why we think it’s so important to give professors life-time tenure, so they’ll never be afraid to speak out when they disagree with popular thought? So why is Dr. MacLachlan so unwilling to say that, while the student protestors had every right to yell at the feminist critics, they were in fact anti-intellectual for doing so?

To my thinking, the primary reason campus feminists are so loud in their resistance to criticism of academic feminism is because—like toddlers being told No for the first time—they are not used to it.

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I will make my case for this “terrible twos” hypothesis in Episode II of this series.

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FREE SPEECH FROM FEMINISM SERIES:

I: FREEDOM FROM SPEECH (you were just here)

II: FREEDOM FROM CRITICISM

III: FREE SPEECH vs. FREE SPEECH

“A person who only knows their own side of an argument knows little of that.”

—SethBlogs paraphrasing social psychologist and Heterodox Academy co-founder, Jonathan Haidt, paraphrasing philosopher and free speech defender, John Stuart Mill.

THE FREE EXPUNGE OF IDEAS SERIES:

I: I MAY AGREE WITH WHAT YOU SAY BUT I’LL FIGHT TO THE DEATH YOUR RIGHT TO SAY IT.
II: NO QUESTIONS ASKED (you are here)
III: ONE OPINION FITS ALL
IV: NOTHING TO SEE HERE
V: DEFINE YOUR WAY TO INFALLBILITY (1 of 2)
VI: THE INFALLIBILITY CLOAK (2 of 2)
VII: THE SHAME OF THE GAME

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Recently TV psychologist “Dr. Phil” McGraw promoted an upcoming show regarding sexual assault via a question on his Twitter feed that asked his audience if it would be okay to sleep with a drunk female. From my vantage point, Dr. Phil’s question seemed crass, given that he was asking for a Yes or No response to an inquiry that should provoke us to consider the complex question of where we draw a line in the long and grey spectrum between consent and assault. However, I am much more disconcerted (although not surprised) by the politically correct club’s outrage that Dr. Phil had the audacity to ask his audience for their opinions on this topic: clearly (yelled the critics, in their usual fervor of trial by “ism”plication) Dr. Phil was looking to promote sexual assault in university dorm rooms.

As Ottawa Citizen commentator Angelina Chapin noted:

“People immediately labelled Phil McGraw… a rape apologist. It was like watching a minnow dropped into a piranha tank. Aside from the innocuous snark that characterizes Twitter—’Aren’t you married?’ — the criticisms were an ugly distortion of the original message.

“‘Why are you looking for a green light to rape from Twitter?’ asked Twitter.com/SettlerColonial and ‘You know good and goddamn well that ‘asking’ when a girl ‘deserves’ to be raped is a destructive question in itself,’ tweeted Twitter.com/@femme_esq…

“The message spurred a change.org petition demanding Dr. Phil apologize and ‘produce a show that shines a light on survivors of rape and sexual assault and… a national conversation about the specifics of consent.'”

The change.org petition is the work of activist Carmen Rios, who was subsequently a guest on CKNW’s The Simi Sara Show. She argues that Dr. Phil’s inquiry is akin to the police asking a possible rape victim the ridiculous and irrelevant question, “What were you wearing [to potentially provoke this assault]?”; this is a straw man argument of the worst kind because she associates a question that apparently seeks to blame a victim with an important philosophical one that society ought to—and has a right to—ask. Even if this topic is as simple as Ms. Rios suggests (that there is no grey area between consent and assault), what has happened to our moral conversation that we cannot ask about it?

Apparently, we’re now living in a moral orthodoxy that will ostracize not only those who disagree with it, but also people who have the temerity to inquire about it, by assuming the most sinister interpretations of their questions. And yet, I think Dr. McGraw’s inquiry (or, at least, the actual implications of it) is one of the most daunting in all of moral philosophy: how do we define consent? Finding an answer that takes into account our elusive line between protecting our citizens and allowing them the right to choose is tough work, and I fear any results arrived at through censored discussion.

I think most moral philosophers would agree that a passed out or barely conscious person cannot give consent, but suggesting that people who are slurring their words can no longer choose, in that moment, to take someone home provokes difficult questions. For instance, where is the line between sobriety and the point at which a person is no longer aware of their circumstances enough to consent?

I’m not saying there isn’t a line, but it’s a tricky one for a reasonable person to define. What about cases where two people are in a relationship? If a women comes home drunk from a work party, and initiates something with her husband and he consents, has he sexually assaulted her? Also, are inebriated males victims of sexual assault, too? If not, then we’re saying that drunk male citizens have the ability to choose while intoxicated female citizens do not. That’s a scary conclusion for both sexes. Moreover, if both members of a sexual encounter are drunk, have both of them assaulted each other? These may not be the cases intended by arguments that one must be sober to consent, but they are logically in its catchment area, so how do we deal with them?

The outraged social policy rulers are unwilling to consider any contemplation that does not fit within their rules of acceptable thought. Along with demanding an apology from Dr. Phil, Ms. Rios has called for him to tailor his show to fit the philosophy she has prescribed for this topic; indeed, she notes that various media outlets need to do a better job—when covering such debates—of focusing on the victims. So, along with curtailing free discussion, she’s asking journalists to cast aside their oaths of objectivity when describing the conversation that remains. No need to look at more than one aspect of an issue, just read Ms. Rios’s blog and report her infallible opinion as fact.

The new censorship is upon us.

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THE FREE EXPUNGE OF IDEAS SERIES:

I: I MAY AGREE WITH WHAT YOU SAY BUT I’LL FIGHT TO THE DEATH YOUR RIGHT TO SAY IT.
II: NO QUESTIONS ASKED (you were just here)
III: ONE OPINION FITS ALL
IV: NOTHING TO SEE HERE
V: DEFINE YOUR WAY TO INFALLBILITY (1 of 2)
VI: THE INFALLIBILITY CLOAK (2 of 2)
VII: THE SHAME OF THE GAME

Recently, students in Charles Best Secondary School’s “Social Justice” class decided to protest against a “gentlemen’s club” in my home city of New Westminster. Both the teacher of the class (interviewed by Bill Good on CKNW), and one of the students (interviewed by Simi Sara on the same station), seemed disappointed and perplexed by the negative reaction they received to their attempts to “educate.” Those leading this protest seem to be following the examples of the “Occupy” and “Idle No More” movements, which proclaim themselves to be society’s moral elite, and then are baffled by those who have the audacity to disagree.

When you question people’s character, do they not have a right to be just as passionate in defending themselves as you are in accusing them? These protests could have real consequences for people’s livelihoods and so demand to be rigorously scrutinized.

From what I can gather, the students’ argument against the club comes in two parts:

(1) First, the protestors claim that the business is a part of the sex trade, and so by definition is harmful to the women dancers.

This is a significant charge which requires serious consideration before being levied at an individual business. My understanding is that prevailing opinion amongst social scientists is that those marketing their bodies are best off in a decriminalized “industry” as opposed to being pushed into the shadows by the law. If the students have credible evidence that contradicts that, I would be interested to hear their case. But I suggest they ought to do more than simply associating exotic dancing with all ills of prostitution, which is akin to protesting London Drugs by pointing at all the wrongs of the pharmaceutical industry and illegal drug dealers.

(2) The students’ second argument against the club is that it is sexist (and archaic) for men to go to a club for the purpose of watching unclad female strangers.

Most feminist thinking would agree with the students that such nudity “objectifies women,” but what exactly is the argument behind this truism? I don’t know if men watching naked women think of them as objects or not, but even if such a claim can be demonstrated, is it morally correct for us to tell others how they should think in such situations?

It’s dangerous to condemn anyone’s sexuality, regardless of how unseemly it may seem to the students. A cohort of “social justice” advocates ought to have definitive evidence  that the customers are doing something harmful in their actions before making public judgments of sexual righteousness. From what I’ve heard so far, the students have provided no such argument beyond linking exotic dancing with prostitution. Their case seems to ignore some critical questions:

(A) Is there any evidence of abusive or unsafe work conditions in the particular club they’re protesting?

(B) Are there any academic studies showing that exotic dancers suffer psychologically as a direct result of their occupation (beyond what they would experience in more “respectable” occupations for which they would be qualified)? If yes, then the students may have an interesting moral claim.

(C) But, if not, do these social justice advocates really want to be the morality police who dictate sexual thought?

The students, of course, have the right to protest anything they wish on the basis of any reason they perceive, but when we proclaim ourselves to be the moral judges of our neighbours, we should not be surprised when those judged don’t gratefully accept the lecture.